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Therefore, whilst the unity and consolidation connected with Legislative 
Unity was obtained on the one hand, due care and attention to the local 
matters interesting to each Province were provided for by the preservation 
of local parliaments, and those powers were so arranged as to prevent any 
conflict or struggle which might lead to any difficulty between the several 
sections.1 
 
The Attorney General submits that the Court should not be swayed by 
arguments about the importance of climate change in today’s world … 
Maintaining the jurisdictional balance of the division of powers is always 
more important.2 
 
No country would find 173 billion barrels of oil in the ground and just leave 
them.3 
 
Introduction: Courting Delay, Distraction, and Disaster 
 
In the fall of 2018, the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) issued a special report on the climate science and policy implications of 1.5 ºC 
or higher of global warming above the pre-industrial norm.4 Its conclusions are 
disturbing. There are significant climate and sustainability differences between 
holding warming to 1.5 ºC as opposed to merely below 2 ºC; the latter being the 
original primary target of the United Nations Paris Agreement on climate change, the 
former originally being the more ambitious, aspirational target.5 Rapid, systemic, and 
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1 Charles Tupper, “Union of the Colonies” (10 April 1865), online (blog): Macdonald-Laurier Institute 
<macdonaldlaurier.ca/union-colonies-speech-honourable-provincial-secretary-charles-tupper-april-10-
1865/>.  
2 Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 SKCA 40 [Greenhouse Gas Reference] (Factum 
of the Attorney General of Saskatchewan at para 50 [AG Saskatchewan, “Factum”). See also Dwight 
Newman, “Wrecking the Federation to Save the Planet”, C2C Journal (3 April 2019), online: 
<c2cjournal.ca>.  
3 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, quoted in Jeremy Berke, “No Country Would Find 173 Billion Barrels of 
Oil in the Ground and just Leave Them”, Business Insider (10 March 2017), online: <businessinsider.com>. 
4 United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5 ºC” 
(November 2018), online (pdf): 
<ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_version_report_LR.pdf>.  
5 Paris Agreement, being an Annex to the Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, 
held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015 — Addendum Part two: Action taken by the 
Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session, 29 January 2016, Dec 1/CP.21, CP, 21st Sess, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 at 21–36, online (pdf): <unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf> 
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unprecedented changes to international and local socioeconomic systems are required 
to hold warming to 1.5 ºC and stave off the most disastrous consequences of climate 
change. 
 
The consequences of climate change, of course, are no longer exclusively the 
concern of future generations; the planet, including Canada, is already contending with 
climate change and its costs. According to the Canadian installment6 of the Lancet’s 
global project7 tracking climate change’s public health impacts, climate change is 
contributing to increased wildfires, extreme heat events, unstable Arctic ice 
conditions, changes in Lyme disease distribution, and impacts on food insecurity and 
mental health across Canada. The Canadian Public Health Association argues that the 
delayed response to climate change over the past 25 years has jeopardized human life 
and livelihoods. While these effects will disproportionately impact the most vulnerable 
in our society, every community will be affected, and present emissions pathways are 
heading toward levels of warming and associated climatic changes that will very likely 
exceed our ability to adapt.8 
 
However, neither climate change nor sustainability is a binary, either/or 
phenomenon; a range of outcomes is possible. Similarly, the direction and pace of 
emissions pathways are highly contingent on policy choices. The International Energy 
Agency’s (IEA) 2018 world energy outlook underscores this point. Regarding the 
“huge gap” between the IEA’s “current policies scenario” (i.e. “business as usual”) 
and its “sustainable development scenario,” whereby accelerated clean energy 
transitions put the world on track to meet the goals related to climate change, universal 
access to energy, and clear air, the IEA notes that “[n]one of these potential pathways 
is preordained; all are possible. The actions taken by governments will be decisive in 
determining which path we follow.”9   
 
What path will Canada follow? Canada’s rhetoric aside, it remains more a 
climate laggard than leader. Were the world to adopt Canada’s current greenhouse gas 
reduction ambitions as a global benchmark, for example, the world would be on pace 
for a staggering 5.1 ºC of warming by the end of the century.10 
 
[Paris Agreement].  
6 Lancet Countdown, Canadian Medical Association & Canadian Public Health Association, “Lancet 
Countdown 2018 Report: Briefing for Canada’s Policymakers” (November 2018), online (pdf): 
<lancetcountdown.org/media/1418/2018-lancet-countdown-policy-brief-canada.pdf> [CPHA, “Lancet 
Countdown 2018”]. 
7 Nick Watts et al, “The 2018 Report of the Lancet Countdown on Health and Climate Change: Shaping the 
Health of Nations for Centuries to Come” (2018) 392:10163 Lancet 2479, online: 
<thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(18)32594-7/fulltext>.  
8 CPHA, “Lancet Countdown 2018”, supra note 6. 
9 International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 2018: Executive Summary” (2018) at 1, online: 
<iea.org/weo2018/> [emphasis added]. 
10 Yann Robiou du Pont & Malte Meinshausen, “Warming Assessments of the Bottom-up Paris Agreement 
Emissions Pledges” (2018) 9:4810 Nature Communications 1 at 5. This should not necessarily be taken as 
an indictment of either the bottom-up architecture of the Paris Agreement or the flexible and cooperative 
nature of Canada’s Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change policy, including its 
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In this article, I attempt to unpack a particularly problematic “peril of 
pipelines and riddle of resources,” the theme of this special issue: namely, the 
simultaneous acknowledgement of the need to act urgently and ambitiously on climate 
change, on the one hand, and on the other hand the decision – taken over and over 
again – to delay meaningful action by disputing narrow but largely settled questions 
of jurisdiction and responsibility while steadfastly supporting and subsidizing 
expanded fossil fuels production and export. These disputes delay and distract us from 
the kinds of complex and controversial policy choices that we need to debate and 
decide. Delay courts – quite literally – disaster. 
 
The rest of this article unfolds as follows. In Part I, I examine the 
constitutional challenge to the federal government’s carbon-pricing framework 
referred to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal by the Saskatchewan provincial 
government. By examining the inconsistent and misleading legal submissions 
advanced by both Saskatchewan and Ottawa, I argue that this judicial reference, 
formally and ostensibly focused on constitutional law, serves to effectively mask the 
underlying ineffectiveness of each of these government’s climate change policies. 
 
In Part II of the article, I examine British Columbia’s referral to the BC Court 
of Appeal of a series of interrelated constitutional law questions about its proposed 
regulation of the flow and potential spills of heavy crude oil in the province, and the 
federal government’s assertion of its paramount jurisdiction over interprovincial 
pipelines. Once again, I argue that these governments’ legal submissions – and their 
public statements – about their jurisdiction over matters of environmental protection 
serve to belie the underlying ineffectiveness of their actual environmental policies and 
regulations. 
 
In Part III of the article, I attempt to bring these tensions and contradictions 
into even clearer relief by examining the controversy over the federal government’s 
tabling of Bill C-69 and the bill’s proposed Impact Assessment Act. I argue that the 
law-reform dispute over the bill masks its true deficiency: its failure to meaningfully 
contribute to climate change mitigation and sustainability. I conclude the article by 
discussing the need to prioritize the interdisciplinary analysis of the political barriers 
to urgent and ambitious climate policy. 
 
My argument in this article is that the constitutional law and law reform 
arguments made in respect of carbon pricing, pipeline approvals and regulations, and 
environmental assessment processes are inescapably political. On the one hand, legal 
arguments about the “pith and substance” of each are necessarily normative and 
ineluctably bound up in competing ideologies, values, and public policy perspectives 
on Canada’s social and economic priorities. On the other hand, those same legal “pith 
and substance” arguments are being “weaponized,” not out of genuine, good faith 
 
implementing legislation, the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, which is discussed in the next section 
of this article. The challenge is how to enhance the ambition of each, which is ultimately a political question.  
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disagreements over legal doctrine, but as indirect, collateral attacks on the very 
prospect of urgent and ambitious climate change policymaking.11 
 
My focus, in other words, is simultaneously concentrated on the economic 
and environmental politics of constitutional law, and the constitutional law of 
economic and environmental politics; either approach on its own is insufficient to 
make sense of Canada’s crude politics of carbon pricing, pipelines, and environmental 
assessment.12 By drawing inspiration and guidance from the legal-pluralist theory-
cum-methodology utilized with so much illumination by Macdonald and Wolfe in their 
magisterial analysis of the relationship obtaining between the Constitution and 
Canada’s changing national policies,13 I examine extant case law and doctrine, formal 
legal submissions, the statements of public officials in the news media, and the law-
and-policy discourse of a wide variety of stakeholders in order to show that the “peril 
of pipelines and the riddle of resources” is inextricably bound up in our understandings 
and invocations of constitutional law doctrines and law reform disputes, and vice 
versa. The result is endemic climate inaction, distraction, and delay that we can no 
longer afford.  
 
I.    Not your Father’s Federalism: The Resistance to Carbon Pricing 
 
In 2018, Parliament passed the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act.14 The GGPPA 
implements the federal government’s Pan-Canadian Approach to Pricing Carbon 
Pollution plan15 issued in 2016, which arose out of a First Ministers’ meeting convened 
 
11 A preliminary version of this argument in response to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal’s advisory 
opinion on the constitutionality of the federal government’s carbon-pricing framework is suggested in Jason 
MacLean, Nathalie Chalifour & Sharon Mascher, “Work on Climate, Not Weaponizing the Constitution”, 
The Conversation (8 May 2019), online: <theconversation.com>. 
12 Nathalie Chalifour suggests, for example, that provincial objections to the federal government’s carbon-
pricing framework “appear to be at least partly driven by Parliament’s choice of carbon pricing as a policy 
instrument.” She further argues—and this is beyond dispute—that once the matter of jurisdiction is settled, 
the choice of instrument “is a political one that is outside the constitutional analysis.” I agree, and seek to 
extend Chalifour’s brilliant doctrinal analysis to show that all of the putatively legal arguments surrounding 
not only carbon pricing but also pipeline approvals and regulations as well as environmental assessment 
processes are political and fall outside the traditional boundaries of doctrinal constitutional analysis: see 
Nathalie J Chalifour, “Jurisdictional Wrangling over Climate Policy in the Canadian Federation: Key Issues 
in the Provincial Constitutional Challenges to Parliament’s Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act” (2019) 
50:2 Ottawa L Rev at 27 [Chalifour, “Jurisdictional Wrangling over Climate Policy”]. 
13 Roderick A Macdonald & Robert Wolfe, “Canada’s Third National Policy: The Epiphenomenal or the 
Real Constitution” (2009) 59:4 UTLJ 469; for an initial application of Macdonald & Wolfe’s national policy 
theory and method to Canada’s climate change policies, see Jason MacLean, “Will We Ever Have Paris? 
Canada’s Climate Change Policy and Federalism 3.0” (2018) 55:4 Alta L Rev 889. 
14 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, being Part 5 of the Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No 1, SC 
2018, c 12. The long title of the Act is An Act to mitigate climate change through the pan-Canadian 
application of pricing mechanisms to a broad set of greenhouse gas emission sources and to make 
consequential amendments to other Acts [GGPPA]. 
15 Canada, Environment and Climate Change Canada, “Pan-Canadian Approach to Pricing Carbon 
Pollution, online: <canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/news/2016/10/canadian-approach-pricing-
carbon-pollution.html>.  
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earlier in 2016 by the government – resulting in the Vancouver Declaration16 – before 
the government signed the UN Paris Agreement on climate change.17 
 
Pursuant to the First Ministers’ agreement expressed in the Vancouver 
Declaration to cooperatively collaborate on a national approach to climate change 
policy, the Working Group on Carbon Pricing Mechanisms was established. The 
Working Group’s consensus-based final report – supported by all provinces and 
territories – concluded that pricing carbon is among the most efficient policy 
approaches to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Pricing carbon allows industries 
and individual consumers to identify how they will reduce their own emissions, and 
encourages innovation to find new ways to do so.18 Based on the Working Group’s 
conclusion, the federal government’s Pan-Canadian Approach to Pricing Carbon 
Pollution explains that “economy-wide carbon pricing is the most efficient way to 
reduce emissions, and by pricing pollution, will drive innovative solutions to provide 
low-carbon choices for consumers and businesses.”19 On this basis the government 
established the pan-Canadian Benchmark for carbon pricing.20 The Benchmark 
establishes carbon pricing as a foundational component of Canada’s national climate 
policy. Specifically, the Benchmark embodies the policy objective of ensuring “that 
carbon pricing applies to a broad set of emissions throughout Canada with increasing 
stringency over time to reduce GHG emissions.”21 The Benchmark further provides 
that the federal government will implement a “backstop” carbon pricing system in 
provincial and territorial jurisdictions that fail to implement regulations that align with 
the Benchmark (or where a province or territory requests the government’s 
backstop).22 
 
In May 2017 the federal government released a technical paper outlining the 
operation of the Benchmark and the backstop.23 The technical paper, along with the 
government’s additional documents Guidance on the Pan-Canadian Carbon Pollution 
 
16 Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat, “Vancouver Declaration on Clean Growth and 
Climate Change” (3 March 2016), online: <pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/03/03/communique-canadas-first-
ministers>.  
17 See Catherine Cullen, “Justin Trudeau Signs Paris Climate Treaty at UN, Vows to Harness Renewable 
Energy”, CBC News (22 April 2016), online: <cbc.ca/news>.  
18 Canada, Environment and Climate Change Canada., Working Group on Carbon Pricing Mechanisms: 
Final Report,  (Gatineau, QC: ECCC, 2016), online: <publications.gc.ca/pub?id=9.822040&sl=0>.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Canada, Environment and Natural Resources, “Supplemental Benchmark Guidance”, online: 
<canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/pan-canadian-framework/guidance-carbon-
pollution-pricing-benchmark/supplemental-benchmark-guidance.html> [Government of Canada, 
“Supplemental Benchmark Guidance”]. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Canada, Environment and Climate Change Canada, Technical Paper on the Federal Carbon Pricing 
Backstop (Ottawa: 18 May 2017), online (pdf): <canada.ca/content/dam/eccc/documents/pdf/20170518-2-
en.pdf> [Government of Canada, Technical Paper on Carbon Pricing Backstop]. 
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Pricing Benchmark24 and Supplemental Benchmark Guidance,25 set out the two 
complementary components of the backstop: (1) a fuel charge; and (2) an Output-
Based Pricing System.26 
 
The GGPPA was enacted in June 2018 and implements the foregoing policy 
commitments and mechanisms: Part 1 of the Act implements the fuel charge; Part 2 
implements the Output-Based Pricing System and an excess-emissions charge for 
large industrial emitters. Parts 1 and 2 of the GGPPA apply in provinces and territories 
that do not implement a sufficiently stringent carbon-pricing regime relative to the 
federal government’s Benchmark.27 
 
The fuel charge under Part 1 applies to 22 kinds of greenhouse-gas-emitting 
fuels that are produced, delivered, or used in Canada, including common fuels such as 
gasoline, diesel, and natural gas, as well as less common fuels such as methanol and 
coke oven gas; the subject fuels and their corresponding charges are set out in Schedule 
2 of the GGPPA. The charge rate represents $20 per tonne of C02e from each fuel in 
2019, rising to $50 per tonne of C02e in 2022.28 Part 1 also sets out exemptions, 
including gasoline and diesel used by farmers for farming, and industrial facilities 
subject to the Output-Based Pricing System under Part 2 of the GGPPA.29   
 
Part 2 of the GGPPA administers the Output-Based Pricing System applicable 
to large industrial emitters, or those statutorily “covered facilities” whose emissions 
exceed a minimum industry-specific threshold. Initially, covered facilities are those 
that emit 50 kilotonnes of C02e or more annually.30 Moreover, instead of paying the 
fuel charge under Part 1, industrial emitters qualifying as covered facilities must pay 
compensation for the portion of their emissions that exceed the prescribed industrial-
sector limit. As of this writing, subject to the future development of supporting 
regulations, most sectors’ output-based standard will be set at 80% of the sector’s 
average greenhouse gas emissions intensity; a subset of trade-exposed sectors will be 
 
24 Canada, Environment and Natural Resources, “Guidance on the Pan-Canadian Carbon Pollution Pricing 
Benchmark” online: <canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/pan-canadian-
framework/guidance-carbon-pollution-pricing-benchmark.html>.  
25 Government of Canada, “Supplemental Benchmark Guidance”, supra note 21. 
26 Government of Canada, Technical Paper on Carbon Pricing Backstop, supra note 23. The government 
also published a document explaining that the aim of the system is to minimize adverse impacts on economic 
competitiveness and “carbon leakage” (emitters moving to jurisdictions with relatively less stringent carbon 
regulations) for emissions-intensive, trade-exposed industrial facilities while retaining the carbon price 
signal and incentive to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: see Canada, Environment and Natural Resources, 
“Carbon Pricing: Regulatory Framework for the Output-based Pricing System”, online: 
<canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/climate-action/pricing-carbon-
pollution/output-based-pricing-system.html>.  
27 GGPPA, supra note 14. 
28 Ibid, Schedule 2, Table 2, Item 6. 
29 Ibid, s 36. 
30 Ibid, s 169 at Schedule 3. 
134 UNBLJ    RD UN-B [VOL/TOME 70 
subject to a standard set at 90% of average emissions intensity.31 Accordingly, in 
normal sectors, covered facilities will provide compensation only for emissions that 
exceed 80% of their specific sector’s average; in highly trade-exposed sectors, 
facilities will provide compensation only for emissions that exceed 90% of their 
specific sector’s average.32 Although these thresholds have received relatively little 
attention to date, owing largely to the disproportionate amount of attention paid to the 
ongoing legal dispute over constitutional jurisdiction, they are plainly favourable to 
heavy industrial emitters of greenhouse gas emissions. They also squarely contravene 
Canada’s commitment under the Paris Agreement to undertake economy-wide – as 
opposed to sector-by-sector – reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.33 
 
In the fall of 2018, the federal government announced the result of its 
Benchmark stringency assessments of provincial and territorial climate policies: the 
fuel charge under Part 1 of the GGPPA will apply in Saskatchewan, Ontario, 
Manitoba, New Brunswick, the Yukon, and Nunavut (the latter two at their own 
request) beginning in April 2019; the Output-Based Pricing System under Part 2 will 
apply in Ontario, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, the Yukon, 
Nunavut (the latter four at their own request), and – partially – Saskatchewan.34 
 
Before many of the foregoing regulatory policies were specifically 
established, the province of Saskatchewan referred a constitutional challenge to the 
GGPPA to its Court of Appeal.35 The province’s reference has been dubbed the 
“Saskatchewan strategy,” and is part of what Maclean’s magazine rather notoriously 
characterized as “the resistance” (see Figure One below) to the federal government’s 
carbon pricing plan.36 
 
 
31 Ibid, s 174. 
32 Ibid, ss 174, 175, 184, Schedule 4.  
33 Paris Agreement, supra note 5, art 4.4. 
34 Part 2 will apply to the emissions not covered by Saskatchewan’s own planned output-based system, 
which will cover large industrial facilities that collectively account for approximately 11% of the province’s 
greenhouse gas emissions. Because Saskatchewan’s plan excludes electricity generation and natural gas 
transmissions pipelines, Part 2 will apply to facilities in those sectors that emit 50 kilotonnes or more of 
C02e annually.   
35 Saskatchewan, News and Media, “Province Challenges Federal Government’s Ability to Impose a Carbon 
Tax”, online: <saskatchewan.ca/government/news-and-media/2018/april/25/carbon-tax-case>.  
36 Paul Wells, “Just Try Them: Powerful Conservative Leaders from across the Country are Suddenly United 
against Justin Trudeau’s Carbon Tax Plan. And they’re Spoiling for a Fight”, Maclean’s (1 December 2018), 
online: <macleans.ca>.  
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Notwithstanding the pronouncements of media and political pundits, it is trite 
law that the federal government has ample jurisdiction to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions.37 The government may do so under its criminal law power, its taxation 
power, and its residual peace, order, and good governance (POGG) jurisdiction over 
matters of national concern.38 In the reference initiated by Saskatchewan before the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, the federal government relies on POGG and, in the 
alternative, its taxation power.39 In its oral submissions before the Court, counsel for 
the Attorney General of Canada emphasized that rising greenhouse gas emissions – 
and climate change more generally – are a matter of national concern that the provinces 
are incapable of addressing on their own.40 
 
The federal government also argues that its carbon-pricing Benchmark 
applies nationally; neither Saskatchewan nor any other province is singled out.41 When 
asked by the Court during oral arguments why Ottawa opted for only a “half measure” 
and declined to set a single national carbon price, counsel for the Attorney General of 
Canada explained that the federal government’s establishment of a national 
Benchmark against which each province and territory is assessed respects the 
provinces’ jurisdiction to enact their own legislation.42 As the Attorney General of 
Canada expressed this balance in its written submissions, “[t]he legislation at issue 
encourages the provinces to come up with a made-in-the-province solution, but 
responds to provincial inaction.”43 
 
This is the core of the federal government’s constitutional argument: its 
carbon-pricing plan accords with the interpretive principle of “cooperative 
federalism.”44 At the same time, however, the federal government’s cooperative 
approach does not mean that provinces can choose not to cooperate where the federal 
government’s jurisdiction is already established, an additionally trite principle of 
 
37 See e.g. Nathalie J Chalifour, “Canadian Climate Federalism: Parliament’s Ample Constitutional 
Authority to Legislate GHG Emissions through Regulations, a National Cap and Trade Program, or a 
National Carbon Tax” (2016) 36 NJCL 331. 
38 Ibid; but see Eugénie Brouillet & Bruce Ryder, “Key Doctrines in Canadian Legal Federalism” in Peter 
Oliver, Patrick Macklem & Nathalie Des Rosiers, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2017) 415; Jean LeClair, “The Elusive Quest for the Quintessential 
National Interest” (2005) 38:2 UBC L Rev 353; and Kai D Sheffield, “The Constitutionality of a Federal 
Emissions Trading Regime” (2014) 4:1 Western J Leg Studies 1.  
39 Greenhouse Gas Reference, supra note 2 (Factum of the Attorney General of Canada at paras 65–68 [AG 
Canada, “Factum”]). 
40 Justin Giovannetti, “Federal Lawyers Say Provinces Aren’t Able to Manage Greenhouse Gas Levels 
Alone”, The Globe and Mail (14 February 2019), online: <theglobeandmail.com>.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 AG Canada, “Factum”, supra note 39 at para 101. Support for this position is found in the majority reasons 
for decision in R v Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 SCR 213 at paras 131, 153, 151 DLR (4th) 32 [Hydro-Québec]. 
44 AG Canada, “Factum”, supra note 39 at paras 100–03, 105. 
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constitutional law that Saskatchewan elsewhere accepts.45 As the Attorney General of 
Canada argues in respect of the federal government’s jurisdiction to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions, it is well-settled law that it may do so under its criminal 
law power.46  
 
Saskatchewan is thus no more constitutionally entitled to choose not to 
cooperate with the federal government on regulating greenhouse gas emissions than it 
is free to withhold cooperation on any other matter under federal jurisdiction. Indeed, 
the very lack of provincial cooperation in such matters further supports the recognition 
of Parliament’s exercise of jurisdiction. As Hogg explains in his commentary on the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Munro v National Capital Commission,47 the 
failure of either Quebec or Ontario to cooperate in the development of the national 
capital region would have – absent federal intervention – deprived all Canadians the 
symbolic value of a suitable national capital. Indeed, the Court in Munro took judicial 
notice of the fact that the zoning of the national capital region was only undertaken by 
the federal government after its unsuccessful efforts to secure the cooperation of 
Quebec and Ontario.48 The parallel to the carbon pricing reference is plain.   
 
Saskatchewan insists, however, that its judicial reference is not about 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change, but rather, the nature and future of 
federalism in Canada. Before the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, the province’s 
written submissions to this effect border on the absurd: “[i]n fact, regulations with 
respect to the release of carbon (ie, smoke) into the atmosphere have existed for 
centuries and have always been considered to be a local matter.”49 In support of its 
analogy between smoke resulting from fires and the burning of coal, on the one hand, 
and on the other hand the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases 
resulting from everyday industrial and individual consumer activities (and the local 
regulation of the same), Saskatchewan cites the British Smoke Nuisance Abatement 
(Metropolis) Act of 1853 along with a single academic article on the social movement 
for smoke abatement in nineteenth-century Britain.50  
 
 
45 See the text associated with infra at nn 64–70. 
46 AG Canada, supra note 39 at para 101, citing Syncrude Canada Ltd v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 
FCA 160, and Hydro-Québec, supra note 47. For further background on the application of Parliament’s 
criminal law power to the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, see Sharon Mascher, “Prime Minister 
Trudeau You’ve Got the Power (the Criminal Law Power): Syncrude Canada Ltd v Canada and Greenhouse 
Gas Regulation” (21 June 2016), ABlawg.ca (blog), online (pdf): <ablawg.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Blog_SM_Syncrude_FCA_June2016.pdf>.   
47 Munro v National Capital Commission, [1966] SCR 663, 57 DLR (2d) 753. 
48 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) (loose-leaf updated 2006, 
release 1) at 17.3(b), 17–14. 
49 AG Saskatchewan, “Factum”, supra note 2 at para 24 [emphasis added]. 
50 Smoke Nuisance Abatement (Metropolis) Act 1853 (UK), 16 & 17 Vict, c 128; Carlos Flick, “The 
Movement for Smoke Abatement on 19th Century Britain” (1980) 21:1 Technology & Culture 29, cited in 
AG Saskatchewan, “Factum”, supra note 2 at para 24, n 22.   
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Regrettably, it appears that the Attorney General of Saskatchewan failed to 
appreciate the history lesson offered by its sole academic source. In the article 
exploring the nineteenth-century social movement for smoke abatement in Britain 
relied on by the province, the article’s author offers the following conclusions, which 
I quote at length in order to underscore the degree to which they fail to offer any 
support for Saskatchewan’s historical claim about the rightful local level of smoke 
abatement regulation: 
 
Despite the powers given to local governments to curtail commercial smoke 
pollution, the general verdict by the 1880s was that little improvement had 
resulted. 
 
[…] 
 
Parliament passed laws giving local authorities the power to act; the local 
authorities, forced to confront the polluters at close quarters in the councils 
and courts, wavered and passed responsibility back to the central 
government. In the end, little abatement was achieved.51  
 
In any event, perhaps the ineffectiveness of local carbon – “ie, smoke”52 – regulation 
in nineteenth-century Britain is as beside-the-point as it would otherwise appear 
insofar as Saskatchewan insists that its reference is not about climate change policy at 
all, but rather federalism: “[t]he Attorney General [of Saskatchewan] submits that the 
Court should not be swayed by arguments about the importance of climate change in 
today’s world … Maintaining the jurisdictional balance of the division of powers is 
always more important.”53 
 
 In its oral submissions before the Court of Appeal, the Attorney General of 
Saskatchewan reiterated this curious position, maintaining that “the government of 
Saskatchewan is not made up of a bunch of climate-change deniers […] and recognizes 
that climate change is a serious issue that has to be addressed and that effective 
measures are required to deal with greenhouse gas emissions.”54 Having said that, 
however, the Attorney General proceeded to argue that unless the Court strikes down 
the GGPPA, “the federation, over time, will wither and cease to exist.”55 
 
 I characterize this argument as “curious” (charitably) for two reasons; the 
first, which should be obvious, is the conclusively-established existential threat that 
climate change poses to humanity and countless other species, while the second 
requires a little more unpacking. Both are telling. 
 
51 Flick, ibid at 37, 50 [emphasis added]. 
52 AG Saskatchewan, “Factum”, supra note 2 at para 24. 
53 Ibid at para 50. 
54 Counsel for the Attorney General of Saskatchewan, quoted in Justin Giovannetti, “Federal Carbon Tax 
Violates Canada’s Founding Principles, Saskatchewan’s Lawyers Argue”, The Globe and Mail (14 February 
2019), online: <theglobeandmail.com>   
55 Ibid. 
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 First, the presumably obvious argument: Climate change is an existential 
threat to human and much non-human life on Earth.56 The original balance of federal 
and provincial powers in Canada formalized in 1867, leaving aside for the moment the 
settled interpretive principle that those powers evolve as our society changes, will be 
of little importance if we fail to mitigate climate change and avoid its most catastrophic 
consequences. Surely the Attorney General of Saskatchewan does not believe that the 
original constitutional division of powers is more important than effectively mitigating 
climate change. Yet that was the thrust of its submissions to the Saskatchewan Court 
of Appeal.    
 
 Second, upon a little unpacking of Saskatchewan’s interpretation of the 
constitutional division of powers in other cases, it becomes clear that its commitment 
to an originalist interpretation in the carbon price reference is entirely insincere, and 
has more to do with crude politics than constitutional law. 
 
 Beginning with its factum before the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in the 
carbon pricing reference, the Attorney General of Saskatchewan advances the 
following originalist interpretation of the constitutional division of powers: 
 
It is the Attorney General’s position that under our Constitution the federal 
government has no authority to second guess provincial decisions with 
respect to matters within provincial jurisdiction. Such a position is 
fundamentally at odds with the very nature of our federation. It represents 
the federal government taking a big brother or an “Ottawa knows best” role 
which was never envisioned by the framers of our Constitution and which 
strikes at the very bedrock foundations of our Constitution.57   
 
The Attorney General of Saskatchewan further argues that “the historical evidence 
supports the view that Canada was intended to be a federal state with a strong federal 
government and with strong provincial governments, each intended to act 
independently within the realms of their respective jurisdictions.”58  
 
However, as an Intervener before the Supreme Court of Canada in the recent 
interprovincial beer case of Comeau,59 the Attorney General of Saskatchewan 
advanced an altogether antithetical legal argument. The province characterized the 
case before the Court as follows: “[t]his appeal confronts the Court with an approach 
to constitutional interpretation best described as ‘originalist,’ deployed to overturn 
decisions of this Court and the Judicial Committee [of the Privy Council] in 
foundational cases on the scope of section 121 and the trade and commerce power.”60 
 
 
56 See e.g. IPCC, supra note 4. 
57 AG Saskatchewan, “Factum”, supra note 2 at para 13 [emphasis added]. 
58 Ibid at para 29. 
59 R v Comeau, 2018 SCC 15 [Comeau]. 
60 Comeau, supra note 59 (Factum of the Attorney General of Saskatchewan at para 2) [AG Saskatchewan, 
“Comeau Intervention Factum”]. 
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Moreover, citing approvingly the position of the Honourable Ian Binnie, who 
was no constitutional originalist as a justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, the 
Attorney General of Saskatchewan proceeded to argue in Comeau that “[t]he historical 
records of Canada’s confederation are notoriously poor”.61 Yet more problematic, the 
Attorney General of Saskatchewan argued, the use of original intent as an interpretive 
method “renders the law inherently uncertain, and new historical evidence (or, more 
likely, new interpretations or inferences from the same body of pre-existing evidence) 
could redesign the architecture of our federation in every case.”62 
 
Accordingly, the Attorney General of Saskatchewan advised the Supreme 
Court in Comeau thus: “[d]espite careful appreciation for historic extrinsic evidence, 
this Court has issued many abjurations against ‘originalism,’ a doctrine which is ‘flatly 
inconsistent’ with purposive interpretations … Both the Courts and the partners of 
Confederation have tended to the ‘living tree.’”63 
 
The inconsistency of the Attorney General of Saskatchewan’s 
methodological approach to constitutional interpretation in Comeau as compared with 
its submissions before the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in the carbon pricing 
reference is nothing short of astonishing, and cannot be explained away by the 
different parts and provisions of the Constitution at issue in each of these cases. The 
arguments about constitutional interpretation advanced by Saskatchewan are flatly 
inconsistent and irreconcilable. Nor can the Province’s legal positions be explained 
away as mere examples of the kinds of strategic and self-interested choices routinely 
made by litigants. Given the Attorney General’s responsibility to promote justice and 
protect the public interest, and given the stakes of the carbon pricing reference 
(namely, Canada’s ability to effectively respond to the existential threats posed by 
climate change), the Province’s selective and self-serving approach to constitutional 
interpretation is profoundly irresponsible. 
 
Yet the province’s inconsistency does not end there. In the reference presently 
pending before the BC Court of Appeal concerning the regulation of “heavy oil,” 
which is discussed below in the next section of this article, the Attorney General of 
Saskatchewan has intervened in order to support Ottawa’s position that the federal 
government’s jurisdiction to approve and regulate interprovincial undertakings, no 
matter how disproportionately provincial the potential environmental effects of such 
undertakings, is paramount and plenary. According to the Attorney General of 
Saskatchewan in the “Heavy Oil” reference,  
 
Saskatchewan supports federal environmental regulation of inter-provincial 
works and undertakings. Saskatchewan recognises the need for rigorous 
federal environmental review of such projects. That too is an important part 
of the federal jurisdiction: to ensure environmental protection in the 
 
61 Ibid at para 13, citing Hon Ian Binnie, “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent” in Grant 
Huscroft & Ian Brodie, eds, Constitutionalism in the Charter Era (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2004) at 370–72. 
62 AG Saskatchewan, “Comeau Intervention Factum”, supra note 60 at para 13 [citations omitted]. 
63 Ibid at paras 17–18 [citations omitted]. 
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interests of all Canadians, with respect to projects, that affect all 
Canadians. 
 
[…] 
 
The federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over the environmental 
issues relating to the operation of the [Trans Mountain] pipeline and the 
product being shipped, as part of the national regulatory framework over all 
aspects of an inter-provincial undertaking.64    
 
The Attorney General of Saskatchewan additionally acknowledges in the BC Heavy 
Oil reference that a “key area” of “federal environmental jurisdiction” relates to, 
among other things, its criminal law power.65 Saskatchewan then proceeds to affirm 
the already-settled issue of the federal government’s constitutional jurisdiction to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions under its criminal law power by admitting that “a 
cooperative and consultative approach by the federal government does not mean that 
the province has jurisdiction to regulate the environmental aspects of matters within 
federal jurisdiction.”66 
 
Now that is hardly your father’s federalism! 
 
Saskatchewan’s kaleidoscopic approach to constitutional interpretation may 
be summed up thus: original intent is relevant – and legally fatal – to the regulation of 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change, but not to the trade and commerce 
power, to which original intent has no application whatsoever; provinces may not 
regulate the environmental aspects of interprovincial oil pipelines, which are subject 
to the federal government’s national regulatory framework, but provinces can ignore 
the federal government’s national regulatory framework for climate change mitigation 
(indeed, the future of the federation depends on it); Ottawa “knows best” when the 
issue is the environmental review of interprovincial oil pipelines, but Ottawa 
inappropriately plays the role of “big brother” when it tries to establish a pan-Canadian 
climate pricing framework. 
 
In an opinion-editorial defending Saskatchewan’s constitutional challenge to 
the federal government’s carbon pricing plan, Saskatchewan Premier Scott Moe 
 
64 Reference re Environmental Management Act (British Columbia), 2019 BCCA 181 (Factum of the 
Attorney General of Saskatchewan at v) [emphasis added]. 
65 Ibid at para 15. 
66 Ibid at para 18. A reviewer of this article raised the potential counter-argument that Saskatchewan’s 
position with respect to jurisdiction over interprovincial undertakings is consistent with its more traditional 
understanding of federalism and, as such, aligns with its position in the carbon pricing reference. This 
counter-argument must be rejected, however, because it altogether ignores the irreconcilable inconsistency 
of Saskatchewan’s position regarding the scope of the federal government’s jurisdiction to regulate in 
respect of environmental protection—limited, if not non-existent in respect of GHG emissions, but ample 
and exclusive in respect of interprovincial pipelines. The concern underlying these irreconcilable positions 
is political, not doctrinal.  
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declared that “our province will never stand down to the Trudeau carbon tax.”67 While 
such rhetoric may – regrettably – make for good politics, it is a poor proxy for public 
policy. After all, the court challenge will eventually conclude, be it with the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal’s advisory opinion or, almost assuredly, with the 
Supreme Court of Canada having the final word. The matter of jurisdiction over the 
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, already largely settled, will be settled (again), 
leaving Saskatchewan to finally reckon with the far more complex and controversial 
issue: how to wean itself off of its economic and fiscal dependence on fossil fuels and 
transition to a sustainable, renewable-energy-based economy and society. No court 
opinion concerning legislative jurisdiction can contribute much – if anything – to this 
fateful reckoning.68 
 
Ottawa, however, fares no better by comparison. As I discuss in the next 
section of this article, in contrast to its cooperative approach to environmental 
regulation offered in defence of its carbon-pricing framework, it is simultaneously 
advancing a unilateral approach to the regulation of interprovincial crude oil pipelines, 
despite the disproportionate environmental risks borne by particular provinces and 
local Indigenous communities, let alone the outsized and unsustainable climate 
impacts of new pipelines and expanded oil sands production. 
 
Meanwhile, as the federal government defended its jurisdiction to 
cooperatively implement a national price on carbon before the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal, it misleads the courts and the country when it advances the overly-generalized 
claims that (1) “carbon pricing works”69 and (2) its proposed carbon-pricing 
framework is capable of “making a significant contribution towards meeting Canada’s 
Paris Agreement targets”.70 While the evidence is clear that in jurisdictions having a 
 
67 Scott Moe, “Why Saskatchewan is Fighting the Trudeau Carbon Tax in Court”, Regina Leader-Post (11 
February 2019), online: <leaderpost.com>.  
68 Indeed, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal’s eventual advisory opinion affirming the constitutionality of 
the GGPPA is almost entirely irrelevant from a climate-policy perspective. (Greenhouse Gas Reference, 
supra note 2.) While the majority’s recognition of climate change as a major threat to Canada and the planet 
is welcome, and will help bring Canada in line with the growing number of countries whose courts are 
acting as bulwarks supporting the urgent political action required to mitigate climate change, the Court’s 
recognition alone is likely to have little-to-no impact on policymaking. Tellingly, on the very same day the 
Court of Appeal issued its 151-page advisory opinion (including both the reasons of the majority of the 
Court along with a dissenting opinion), Saskatchewan’s premier immediately vowed to seek leave to appeal 
from the Court of Appeal’s opinion to the Supreme Court of Canada: see Creeden Martell, “Saskatchewan 
Premier Plans to Appeal Carbon Tax Decision to Supreme Court”, CBC News (3 May 2019), online: 
<cbc.ca/news>. The immediacy of the Premier’s announcement belies any reasonable interpretation of this 
dispute as being about a genuine disagreement over the fine points of constitutional law doctrine. The 
majority of the Court of Appeal itself recognized the true importance of the issue before it as being one of 
climate policy and not constitutional law when it explained (at para 144) that “[i]f it is necessary to apply 
established doctrine in a slightly different way to ensure both levels of government have the tools essential 
for dealing with something as pressing as climate change, that would seem to be entirely appropriate.” For 
an initial analysis—both legal and political—of the Court of Appeal’s opinion, see MacLean, Chalifour & 
Mascher, supra note 11.       
69 AG Canada, “Factum”, supra note 39 at para 44. 
70 Ibid at para 43. 
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carbon price, carbon emissions are lower than they would otherwise be,71 the federal 
government’s claim nonetheless belies the more precise point that Canada’s proposed 
pricing scheme starts at too low of a price and its price will not rise fast enough either 
to meet Canada’s already unambitious emissions-reduction targets under the Paris 
Agreement or to more meaningfully contribute to climate change mitigation. As the 
IPCC explains in its path-breaking special report on 1.5 ºC global warming, an 
effective carbon price will begin at a minimum of US$135 per tonne of C02e, and, 
depending on a series of other variables, an effective price might have to reach as high 
as US$5,500.72 The carbon pricing reference serves only to distract from and delay 
Canada’s far more complex and controversial public policy reckoning. I will return to 
this more foundational question in the concluding section of the article.      
      
II.  Crying Over Spilled Oil 
 
The Trans Mountain pipeline system was originally constructed in 1953; it carries oil 
from Strathcona County, Alberta to a coastal marine terminal in Burnaby, British 
Columbia.73 The Texas-based company Kinder Morgan originally owned the pipeline, 
but in 2018 the company’s shareholders approved the sale of Trans Mountain to the 
Government of Canada.74 Since 2012, Kinder Morgan had been seeking the approval 
of British Columbia and the federal government for its proposed $7.4-billion 
expansion of Trans Mountain (i.e. “twinning” the pipeline by constructing an 
additional pipeline along the existing pipeline’s route).75 Trans Mountain’s present 
capacity is approximately 300,000 barrels per day of “batched” petroleum products, 
including crude, semi-refined, and refined oil.76 If the expansion project is ultimately 
completed, Trans Mountain will have the capacity to transport approximately 890,000 
 
71 Ibid at para 44. 
72 IPCC, supra note 4. For a discussion of the implications of the IPCC’s special report for Canada’s climate 
policy, see Jason MacLean, “The Problem with Canada’s Gradual Climate Policy”, Policy Options (26 
October 2018), online: <policyoptions.irpp.org> [MacLean, “Canada’s Gradual Climate Policy”]. For 
further discussion of Canada’s proposed pricing framework in relation to the concept of the social cost of 
carbon, see Jason MacLean, “Trudeau’s Carbon Price Clever Politics, not Credible Policy”, Policy Options 
(14 October 2016), online: <policyoptions.irpp.org>. More generally, see also Carbon Pricing Leadership 
Coalition, Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices (Washington: International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association & The World Bank, 2017), 
online (pdf): 
<static1.squarespace.com/static/54ff9c5ce4b0a53decccfb4c/t/59b7f2409f8dce5316811916/150522733274
8/CarbonPricing_FullReport.pdf>.  
73 Canada, National Energy Board, “Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC – Trans Mountain Expansion Project”, 
online: <neb-one.gc.ca/pplctnflng/trnsmntnxpnsn/index-eng.html>.  
74 “Trans Mountain, Trudeau and First Nations: A Guide to the Political Saga so far”, The Globe and Mail 
(24 May 2019), online: <theglobeandmail.com>.  
75 Ibid. 
76 Trans Mountain Corporation, “Product”, online: <transmountain.com/product>.  
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barrels of oil per day, nearly a threefold increase.77 Notably, the expanded pipeline 
will be designed to transport heavy, highly corrosive bitumen crude oil.78 
 
Kinder Morgan submitted its expansion proposal to the National Energy 
Board (NEB) in 2013. In the spring of 2016, the NEB issued a report to the federal 
Cabinet recommending the project’s approval subject to a number of technical 
conditions.79 Soon thereafter, the federal Minister of Natural Resources convened a 
ministerial panel to further review the expansion proposal, particularly the concerns 
of Indigenous peoples and other Canadians situated along the pipeline’s right of way 
and shipping route that may not have been fully considered under the NEB’s original 
review.80 Following the conclusion of the government’s supplemental review in the 
fall of 2016, the Cabinet directed the NEB to issue a Certificate of Public Convenience 
and Necessity – effectively, an approval – pursuant to the National Energy Board Act 
for the Trans Mountain expansion project.81 
 
In early 2018, the BC provincial government announced its intention to 
develop additional regulatory measures to improve its “preparedness, response and 
recovery” relating to spills of heavy oil, including diluted bitumen, the grade of oil to 
flow through the expanded Trans Mountain pipeline.82 The BC government explained 
that its proposed regulations would (1) ensure immediate and geographically-specific 
responses to heavy oil spills, whether from a pipeline or from the rail or truck transport 
of oil; (2) maximize the application of regulations to marine oil spills by 
complementing existing federal measures; (3) restrict the transportation of heavy oil 
following a spill until the behaviour and effects of spilled heavy oil can be better 
understood and managed; and (4) allow for compensation for the loss of public and 
 
77 Trans Mountain Corporation, “Expansion Project”, online: <transmountain.com/project-overview>.  
78 Ibid. 
79 NEB, supra note 73. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Canada, “Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Pipeline Announcement”, online: 
<pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/11/29/prime-minister-justin-trudeaus-pipeline-announcement>. The Trans 
Mountain expansion project was also subject to review by the Environmental Assessment Office (EAO) of 
British Columbia, and in December 2016, the EAO issued a summary report recommending that an 
Environmental Assessment Certificate be issued in respect of Trans Mountain subject to 37 conditions; in 
January 2017 the BC government issued the Certificate in accordance with the EAO’s recommendations. 
The federal government’s approval of the project would later be quashed, however, by the Federal Court of 
Appeal because (1) the NEB unreasonably concluded that Trans Mountain’s expansion was unlikely to 
cause adverse environmental effects, and (2) the government failed to satisfy its constitutional duty to 
consult and accommodate affected Indigenous groups: See Tsleil-Waututh Nation v Canada (Attorney 
General), 2018 FCA 153 [Tsleil-Waututh]. 
82 BC Gov News, “Environment and Climate Change Strategy: Additional Measures Being Developed to 
Protect B.C.’s Environment from Spills”, online: <news.gov.bc.ca/releases/2018ENV0003-000115> [BC 
Gov News, “Additional Measures”]. For an initial analysis of BC’s proposed measures, see Jason MacLean, 
“The Trans Mountain Saga as a Public Policy Failure”, Policy Options (13 April 2018), online: 
<policyoptions.irpp.org>.    
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cultural use of lands, resources, and public amenities resulting from spills of heavy 
oil.83 
 
Following a pointed political reaction to British Columbia’s proposal,84 the 
province referred what was considered to be the most controversial of its proposed 
measures – its authority to restrict the flow of heavy oil following a spill – as a 
constitutional question to the B.C. Court of Appeal.85 British Columbia’s “Order-in-
council and Reference Question” asks whether its proposed amendment (see below) 
of the B.C. Environmental Management Act86 is intra vires the legislative authority of 
British Columbia, and if so, whether its legislative amendment applies to hazardous 
substances brought into the province by means of interprovincial undertakings.87 The 
reference question further asks whether existing federal legislation renders all or part 
of the proposed legislative amendment inoperative.88 
 
British Columbia’s proposed legislation provides, in relevant part, as follows. 
It sets out a definition of “heavy oil” in well-established terms of gravity and viscosity, 
and adds this defined term to a class of hazardous substances, the possession, charge, 
or control of which above certain minimum levels requires a provincial permit from 
the provincial director of waste management.89 The legislation stipulates conditions 
for the issuance (with or without conditions attached), suspension, and cancellation of 
such “hazardous substance permits.”90 Permits may be cancelled or suspended if the 
permit-holder fails to comply with the conditions attached to the permit, which may 
include 
 
(a) conditions respecting the protection of human health or the 
environment, including conditions requiring the holder of the permit 
 
(i) to implement and maintain appropriate measures to prevent a 
release of the substance, 
 
(ii) to implement and maintain appropriate measures to ensure 
that any release of the substance can be minimized in gravity 
and magnitude, through early detection and early response, and 
 
83 BC Gov News, “Additional Measures”, supra note 82. 
84 For further background, see Jason MacLean, “The Constitutional Complexity of Pipelines: It’s as Clear 
as Bitumen”, The Globe and Mail (5 February 2018), online: <theglobeandmail.com> [MacLean, “The 
Constitutional Complexity of Pipelines”]; Jason MacLean, “Trans Mountain’s Only Certainty – Death and 
Carbon Taxes”, Vancouver Sun (17 April 2018), online: <vancouversun.com> [MacLean, “Trans 
Mountain’s Only Certainty”]. 
85 BC Gov News, “Province Submits Court Reference to Protect B.C.’s Cast” online: 
<news.gov.bc.ca/releases/2018PREM0019-000742> [BC Gov News, “Court Reference”]. 
86 Environmental Management Act, SBC 2003, c 53. 
87 BC Gov News, “Court Reference”, supra note 85. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
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(iii) to maintain sufficient capacity, including dedicated 
equipment and personnel, to be able to be able to respond 
effectively to a release of the substance in the manner and within 
the time specified by the director; 
 
(b) conditions respecting the impacts of a release of the substance, 
including conditions requiring the holder of the permit 
 
 (i) to respond to a release of a substance in the manner and  
 within the time specified by the director, and  
 
 (ii) to compensate, without proof of fault or negligence, any 
 person, the government, a local government or a First Nations 
 government for damages […].91        
 
British Columbia premises its proposed legislation on two principal purposes: (1) the 
protection of British Columbia’s environment (including the terrestrial, freshwater, 
marine, and atmospheric environment), human health and well-being, and the 
economic, social, and cultural vitality of BC communities; and (2) the implementation 
of the polluter pays principle.92 In the same vein, British Columbia argues that its 
reference “is not about the desirability of interprovincial pipelines or about the 
undisputed federal authority to decide whether they should be built or operated 
(subject, of course, to entrenched rights, including under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982).”93 Rather, the province argues that its constitutional reference “is about the 
ordinary operation of principles of Canadian federalism to proposed amendments to 
an indisputably constitutional provincial environmental statute”.94      
 
Critics of the province’s proposed regulations, however, spy an alternative – 
political – purpose. Alberta premier Rachel Notley reacted to British Columbia’s 
announcement of its intention to develop the above regulations by stating “[t]he 
government of Alberta will not – we cannot – let this unconstitutional attack on jobs 
and working people stand.”95 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau reacted similarly by 
stating in a radio interview “[l]ook, we’re in a federation. We’re going to get that 
pipeline built.”96 Alan Ross, a lawyer who acts for Kinder Morgan and is lead counsel 
to the Canadian Energy Pipeline Association on the “Heavy Oil” reference before the 
B.C. Court of Appeal, argued that “[t]o the extent that this is meant to imperil Trans 
Mountain, there really is a very clear federal jurisdiction with respect to matters such 
 
91 Ibid. British Columbia also intends to establish an independent scientific panel to help address the 
scientific uncertainties in respect of the behaviour of heavy oil when it is spilled in water. 
92 Ibid. For a detailed discussion of the adverse effects of heavy oil spills in oceans, estuaries, rivers, lakes, 
ponds, or on land, see Reference re Environmental Management Act (British Columbia), 2019 BCCA 181 
(Factum of the Attorney General of British Columbia at paras 36-46) [AG British Columbia, “Factum”]. 
93 AG British Columbia, “Factum”, supra note 96 at para 134. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Quoted in MacLean, “The Constitutional Complexity of Pipelines”, supra note 84. 
96 Ibid. 
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as pipelines or railways that cross provincial borders and are federally regulated.”97 
Fueling these reactions, of course, were the earlier political campaign remarks made 
by B.C. NDP leader John Horgan, who promised to use “every tool in the toolbox” to 
prevent the completion of the Trans Mountain expansion.98 
  
Echoing and amplifying these claims, The Globe and Mail, Canada’s national 
newspaper of record, alleged that British Columbia’s regulatory proposal was little 
more than – pun presumably intended – a crude tactic in its “guerrilla war designed to 
subject Trans Mountain to a death by a thousand cuts.”99 In a subsequent editorial 
following Kinder Morgan’s decision to suspend all non-essential spending on the 
Trans Mountain expansion and demand a guarantee from the federal government that 
the project would be approved, the Globe accused British Columbia of “naked 
hypocrisy.”100 After noting that the B.C. provincial government’s opposition to the 
Trans Mountain expansion is based on the government’s “stated desire to protect the 
environment”,101 the Globe observed – not incorrectly – that the province was at the 
same time “supporting the development of the province’s natural-gas reserves, 
offering tax breaks to a $40-billion project that includes, wait for it, a new pipeline 
and a new tanker terminal on the B.C. coast.”102 British Columbia, in the Globe’s 
estimation, was precipitating a constitutional crisis “in the name of environmental 
principles it only adheres to when it is in its political interest, but abandons when it 
sees a dollar in it.”103          
 
In light of these competing interpretations, how should the B.C. Court of 
Appeal resolve the province’s “Heavy Oil” reference?     
 
 
97 Ibid. 
98 See Andrew MacLeod, “Death of Kinder Morgan Project a Campaign Promise, Premier Says”, The Tyee 
(10 April 2018), online: <thetyee.ca>. While such remarks are not admissible as evidence of legislative 
intent as part of a court’s statutory interpretation (including the constitutional interpretation of legislation’s 
“pith and substance”), it is equally true that such remarks cannot be unheard. On the evidentiary point, see 
Tesla Motors Canada ULC v Ontario (Ministry of Transportation), 2018 ONSC 5062 at para 58, citing 
Reference re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, [1984] 1 SCR 297 at 318, 8 DLR (4th) 1. Perhaps 
rendering this technical evidentiary point moot, however, is the “Confidence and Supply Agreement” 
concluded between the BC NDP and BC Green Party, under which, among other things, the caucuses of the 
two parties agreed to “employ every tool available to the new government” to stop the Trans Mountain 
project: See British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates,  41-3, Issue 104 (14 March 
2018) at 3534 (Hon G Heyman).  
99 “Globe Editorial: Trudeau Must Stand up to B.C.’s Crude Tactics”, The Globe and Mail (1 February 
2018), online: <theglobeandmail.com>.  
100 “Globe Editorial: Trans Mountain is Now an Economic and Constitutional Disaster”, The Globe and 
Mail (8 April 2018), online: <theglobeandmail.com>.  
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
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The province’s legal position relies in large part on the ruling of the B.C. 
Supreme Court in Coastal First Nations v British Columbia (Environment).104 In 
Coastal First Nations, the Court affirmed the right – indeed, the responsibility – of 
provinces to regulate the territorially-based impacts of economic projects, even if those 
projects constitute federal undertakings (in Coastal First Nations, the project was the 
controversial Northern Gateway oil pipeline proposal). The province places significant 
weight on the following explanation provided by the Court: “[t]o disallow any 
provincial regulation over the project because it engages a federal undertaking would 
significantly limit the province’s ability to protect social, cultural and economic 
interests in its lands and waters. It would go against the current trend in the 
jurisprudence favouring, where possible, co-operative federalism.”105 
 
The principle of co-operative federalism was similarly utilized by the Federal 
Court to uphold federal jurisdiction in respect of an environmental assessment of an 
open-pit copper and gold mine in British Columbia.106 In Taseko Mines Limited v 
Canada (Environment), the Court held that “a project of such magnitude as the one 
considered in the present case will likely have impacts on areas of both provincial and 
federal responsibility.”107 This decision accords not only with the interpretive principle 
of cooperative federalism, but also with the contextual constitutional analysis the 
Supreme Court of Canada has taken to environmental protection legislation. The Court 
has recognized that environmental concerns are a matter of “superordinate 
importance” not assigned expressly or exclusively to either the federal or provincial 
heads of power.108 The Court’s constitutional interpretation of environmental 
protection legislation is further premised on the recognition that “our common future, 
that of every Canadian community, depends on a healthy environment.”109 More 
specifically, given that the impacts of environmental harms and pollution are diffuse, 
pervasive, cumulative, and have long-term implications, the Supreme Court of Canada 
has ruled that “the Constitution should be so interpreted as to afford both levels of 
government ample means to protect the environment while maintaining the general 
structure of the Constitution.”110  
 
104 Coastal First Nations v British Columbia (Environment), 2016 BCSC 34 [Coastal First Nations]. For an 
initial discussion of the application of this decision to the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion, see Chris 
Tollefson & Jason MacLean, “Here is Why B.C. Must Do its Own Review of the Trans Mountain Pipeline”, 
The Globe and Mail (23 May 2017), online: <theglobeandmail.com>.  
105 Coastal First Nations, supra note 104 at para 53, quoted in BC Gov News, “Court Reference”, supra 
note 85. See also Rogers Communication v Châteauguay, 2016 SCC 23 at para 38: when “courts apply the 
various constitutional doctrines, they must take into account the principle of co-operative federalism, which 
favours, where possible, the concurrent operation of statutes enacted by governments at both levels” [Rogers 
Communication].  
106 Taseko Mines Limited v Canada (Environment), 2017 FC 1100 [Taseko Mines]. The leading case on co-
operative federalism is Canadian Western Bank v Alberta, 2007 SCC 22 [Canadian Western Bank]. 
107 Taseko Mines, supra note 106 at para 160. 
108 Hydro-Québec, supra note 43 at para 85. 
109 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v Hudson (Town), 2001 SCC 40 at para 1. 
110 Hydro-Québec, supra note 43 at para 116, citing Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister 
of Transport), [1992] 1 SCR 3, 88 DLR (4th) 1. 
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Moreover, as the Supreme Court of Canada recently observed in Comeau 
(which is also discussed in the previous section), the scope of federal authority granted 
over interprovincial economic matters must be carefully circumscribed so as not to 
invalidate “[a]gricultural supply management schemes, public health-driven 
prohibitions, environmental controls, and innumerable comparable regulatory 
measures that incidentally impede the passage of goods crossing provincial 
borders”.111 
 
Based on these foundational precedents, British Columbia argues that the true 
pith and substance of its proposed heavy oil spill regulations is to protect the 
province’s environment falling under its broad power over property and civil rights 
under section 92(13), supplemented by its authority over matters of a local or private 
nature under section 92(16) and its responsibility to manage public lands under 92(5) 
of the Constitution Act, 1867.112 
 
British Columbia also argues that provincial environmental legislation may 
have “incidental effects” outside the province’s jurisdiction, including effects on 
interprovincial undertakings.113 
 
British Columbia further argues that its regulations are validated by the 
“double aspect” doctrine, whereby both the federal and provincial governments may 
adopt valid legislation in respect of a single matter.114 Its proposed regulations do not 
seek to prevent the construction or operation of any interprovincial undertaking, the 
province argues (notwithstanding the campaign rhetoric of the Premier that would 
appear to suggest otherwise), and there is no precedent suggesting that only the federal 
government may enact environmental protection regulations in relation to the 
accidental discharges of an interprovincial undertaking such as the Trans Mountain 
pipeline.115 
 
111 Comeau, supra note 59 at para 3 [emphasis added]. While Comeau concerned the scope of section 121 
of the Constitution Act, 1867, the Court’s reasoning is equally applicable to the interpretation of the division 
of powers under sections 91 and 92.  
112 AG British Columbia, “Factum”, supra note 92 at para 84. 
113 Ibid at paras 87–88. 
114 Ibid at paras 93–96, citing Canadian Western Bank, supra note 106 at para 30. Here it is important to 
note that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Rogers Communication, supra note 105, does not pose 
an obstacle to British Columbia’s reliance on the double aspect doctrine. As Nathalie Chalifour shows, 
Rogers Communication does not limit the ambit of the double aspect doctrine. Rather, the Court declined to 
apply the doctrine in Rogers Communication because it found that the pith and substance of the municipal 
measure in question concerned radiocommunications, a matter that cannot be assigned to a provincial head 
of power and is therefore incapable of having a double aspect. British Columbia’s “Heavy Oil” regulations, 
by contrast, are distinguishable because their pith and substance concern environmental protection, a matter 
over which federal and provincial jurisdiction is shared. Only in the event of an operational core conflict 
between otherwise valid federal and provincial laws will paramountcy displace the double aspect doctrine: 
see Chalifour, “Jurisdictional Wrangling over Climate Policy”, supra note 12 at 25. 
115 AG British Columbia, “Factum”, supra note 92 at para 96. In the alternative, British Columbia argues 
that its proposed regulations are saved by the ancillary powers doctrine because they are rationally and 
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British Columbia further argues that the federal government cannot invoke 
the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity in respect of its proposed regulations. 
While the federal government has legislative authority over “Lines of Steam or other 
Ships, Railways, Canals, Telegraphs, and other works and Undertakings connecting 
the Province with any other or others of the Provinces, extending beyond the Limits 
of the Province” under sections 91(29) and 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act, 1867, 
there is no precedent stipulating that discharges from any such undertakings are within 
the core of the federal government’s power.116 On the contrary, courts have 
consistently held that interprovincial undertakings are not immune from provincial 
environmental protection laws.117 In light of the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
promotion of cooperative federalism generally and its contextual constitutional 
approach to environmental protection legislation specifically, British Columbia argues 
that it is appropriate to permit multiple levels of government to regulate the resources 
over which they have jurisdiction, and to allow any conflicts to be resolved through 
the application of the doctrine of paramountcy.118     
 
Regarding the federal government’s paramountcy argument, British 
Columbia argues that it too must fail. The province’s proposed heavy oil spill 
regulations are either duplicative or establish higher environmental standards in 
respect of potentially conflicting federal provisions.119 This is insufficient to establish 
federal paramountcy, a situation where compliance with one jurisdiction’s laws 
amounts to defiance of another’s.120 Permissive federal legislation or action – such as 
its conditional approval of the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion – is not frustrated 
for paramountcy purposes by provincial legislation that restricts the scope of the 
federal permission.121 
 
British Columbia’s arguments are compelling, at least on their face; they 
reside comfortably within the Supreme Court of Canada’s cooperative federalism and 
environmental protection jurisprudence. What is arguably the province’s most 
compelling legal argument is also telling politically. As the Supreme Court of Canada 
observed in Canadian Western Bank, Parliament holds in reserve the ultimate legal 
power to make absolutely clear its intention to immunize aspects falling within federal 
authority under the doctrine of paramountcy.122 The federal government’s decision not 
 
functionally related to the larger and constitutionally-valid legislative scheme to which they are to be added: 
see paras 98–102. 
116 Ibid at para 105. 
117 Ibid, citing Regina v TNT Canada Inc (1986), 58 OR (2d) 410, 37 DLR (4th) 297 (CA), and Ontario v 
Canadian Pacific Ltd, [1995] 2 SCR 1031, 24 OR (3d) 454. 
118 Ibid at para 122. 
119 Ibid at para 129. 
120 Ibid at para 127, citing, inter alia, Saskatchewan (Attorney General) v Lemare Lake Logging Ltd, 2015 
SCC 53. 
121 Ibid at para 130, citing Quebec (Attorney General) v Canadian Owners and Pilots Association, 2010 
SCC 39 at para 66. 
122 Ibid at para 121, citing Canadian Western Bank, supra note 106 at para 45. 
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to do so in respect of the Trans Mountain pipeline tells us more about its political 
position than it does about its legal powers.  
 
Indeed, what is striking about the federal government’s position in the Heavy 
Oil reference is its abandonment of the cooperative approach to environmental-cum-
economic policy and regulation that it proudly trumpets in the Saskatchewan carbon 
pricing reference.123 The government’s opening statement in the Heavy Oil reference, 
by contrast, expresses a view of the matter that is markedly unilateral and surprisingly 
shorn of its environmental implications: 
 
After promising to use “every tool” in its legislative “toolbox” to stop the 
expansion of the Trans Mountain Pipeline, the Government of British 
Columbia received legal advice that it would be unconstitutional for it to do 
so. The BC Government then developed a proposed regulatory regime that 
prohibits heavy oil shipment increases unless the Provincial Government, in 
its discretion, issues an authorization permit. Concerned that this regime 
would also be found ultra vires or inapplicable to federally-regulated 
undertakings like the Trans Mountain Pipeline, the BC Government now 
asks the Court to opine on its constitutionality before the legislation is 
enacted.124 
 
The federal government’s legal argument is threefold: (1) the true pith and substance 
of British Columbia’s heavy oil spill regulations – despite their stated purpose of 
environmental protection – is a colourable and ultimately ultra vires attempt to 
regulate interprovincial oil transportation;125 (2) even if the regulations were intra vires 
the province, the regulations would be inapplicable to interprovincial undertakings like 
Trans Mountain by virtue of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity because the 
regulations significantly impair the federal government’s ability to regulate such 
undertakings;126 and (3) the regulations are constitutionally inoperable by virtue of the 
paramountcy doctrine because they conflict with and frustrate existing federal 
legislation that is designed to comprehensively regulate the safe and efficient operation 
of interprovincial oil transportation systems.127     
 
The federal government’s narrowly-framed legal arguments are credible only 
if one accepts the government’s speculative political premise, which is the basis for 
its artificial characterization of the issue as a dispute about jurisdiction over 
 
123 And elsewhere as well. In Comeau for example, the Supreme Court of Canada notes that the Attorneys 
General that intervened in the case concerning the scope of section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867, 
including among others both Canada and Saskatchewan, argued in favour of a narrow interpretation of 
section 121 in order “to give governments expansive scope to impose barriers on goods crossing their 
borders” as a “natural consequence of their position that ‘cooperative federalism’ is a distinct foundational 
principle for constitutional interpretation”: see Comeau, supra note 59 at para 87.  
124 Reference re Environmental Management Act (British Columbia) 2019 BCCA 181 (Factum of the 
Attorney General of Canada at iii) [AG Canada, “Heavy Oil Factum”]. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
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interprovincial oil transportation: “[r]egulating the nature and volume of goods that 
flow through interprovincial undertakings is at the core of Canada’s power under s. 
92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act, 1867.”128 However, the means by which the federal 
government casts aspersions on British Columbia’s heavy oil regulations as political 
and thus constitutionally colourable can also be turned on the government’s central 
argument. 
 
Repeating statements made by Premier Horgan and other members of the BC 
NDP government, the federal government argues that “[t]he only way to make sense 
of the provisions is to appreciate them against the backdrop of the BC Government’s 
true purpose: to block the TMX Project.”129 As a matter of politics, this may well be 
true. As a matter of law, however, it is speculative at best. As speculation, it is no more 
revealing of British Columbia’s “true purpose” than the equally speculative and yet 
entirely reasonable explanation that, having received a legal opinion to the effect that 
the province could not constitutionally block the completion of the Trans Mountain 
pipeline expansion itself, the province pursued its second-best regulatory option: “to 
ensure (as far as reasonably possible) that no harm will be done to persons or property 
in BC by the (storage or) carriage of Heavy Oil, and that if such harm does occur, there 
will be adequate and accessible funds to mitigate, remediate and compensate.”130 
 
Moreover, apart from any political machinations at play, British Columbia’s 
proposed regulations have a sound scientific basis. The NEB’s recommendation and 
the federal Cabinet’s approval of the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion ignored the 
existence of established and troublesome gaps in the scientific understanding of how 
diluted bitumen behaves in cold-water environments.131 According to a recent 
assessment of the peer-reviewed scientific knowledge about bitumen and marine 
environments, there is a “relative paucity of information on the ecological 
consequences of spill response methods”.132 The NEB’s own reconsideration of the 
marine ecosystem impacts of the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion preliminarily 
recommended that the federal government “should review and update federal marine 
shipping oil spill response requirements,” and added that this review should consider 
(1) “updating response organization standards”; (2) “response planning 
methodologies”; (3) “public reporting by response organizations to promote 
transparency of information”; (4) “inclusion of Indigenous peoples and local 
communities in response planning”; and (5) “a requirement for additional response 
 
128 Ibid at para 100 [emphasis added]. 
129 Ibid at para 91. 
130 AG British Columbia, “Factum”, supra note 92 at para 89. 
131 See MacLean, “Trans Mountain’s Only Certainty”, supra note 84; Thomas Sisk, “Science is a Casualty 
of the Trans Mountain Pipeline Debate”, Vancouver Sun (16 April 2018), online: <vancouversun.com>.  
132 Stephanie J Green et al, “Oil Sands and the Marine Environment: Current Knowledge and Future 
Challenges” (2017) 15:2 Frontiers in Ecology & Environment 74 at 79. Green et al conclude overall that 
“[r]egulations to protect marine environments are hindered by a lack of available science and require 
holistic, ecosystem-based frameworks to assess cumulative and co-occurring stresses”: see ibid at 74). 
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resources on all ocean-going vessels.”133 The NEB’s preliminary, draft 
recommendations made pursuant to its reconsideration of its own deficient review of 
the Trans Mountain project (more on this below) does not even consider spill-
prevention and spill-response concerns and methodologies relating to estuaries, rives, 
lakes, ponds, or land. Political or not, British Columbia’s heavy oil spill regulations 
can nevertheless be taken at face value as being grounded in and motivated by 
legitimate scientific concerns.134 
 
Relatedly, the federal government’s legal strategy in the Heavy Oil reference 
of making repeated reference to the B.C. government’s public and political comments 
about the Trans Mountain pipeline, besides being an incomplete – if not legally-
questionable – means of establishing the true purpose of the legislation in question,135 
also shines a decidedly less-than-flattering light on the NEB, on whose presumptive 
expertise and effectiveness the government relies extensively in its written 
submissions before the B.C. Court of Appeal.136 The federal government notes, for 
example, that the National Energy Board Act is “the primary federal legislative 
enactment that regulates the interprovincial transportation of petroleum by pipeline. It 
ensures that federally-regulated pipelines are designed, constructed, operated and 
abandoned in a manner that is safe for the public and the environment.”137 After 
providing a lengthy recounting of the establishment of the NEB in 1959 and the key 
provisions of its controlling legislation, the federal government proceeds to describe 
how the Pipeline Safety Act “modernized the NEB Act in 2016.”138 The federal 
government quotes approvingly remarks made by the Minister of Natural Resources 
Canada to the effect that the purpose of introducing the Pipeline Safety Act was to find 
“new and better ways to improve our world-class regulatory system” and “ensure that 
 
133 Canada, National Energy Board, “Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC (Trans Mountain) Application for the 
Trans Mountain Expansion Project (Project), National Energy Board (Board) reconsideration of aspects of 
its Recommendation Report as directed by Order in Council PC 2018-1177 (Reconsideration) MH-052-
2018” at 39, online (pdf): <neb-one.gc.ca/pplctnflng/mjrpp/trnsmntnxpnsn/trnsmntnxpnsnrprt-eng.pdf>.  
134 Nor is the federal government’s oft-cited (by itself) “Oceans Protection Plan” an effective counter to the 
established gaps in scientific knowledge about how to understand and effectively respond to spills of diluted 
bitumen. The Federal Court of Appeal in Tsleil-Waututh described the 11-page plan as “inchoate” and at an 
“early planning” stage: see Tsleil-Waututh, supra note 81 at paras 471, 661.   
135 See the caselaw cited at supra note 98. But see Rogers Communication, supra note 105 at para 36, where 
the Supreme Court of Canada explains that the purpose of a law or regulatory measure is determined by 
examining both intrinsic evidence (such as the preamble of a statute, or the general purposes stated in the 
resolution authorizing a measure) and extrinsic evidence, “such as that of the circumstances in which the 
measure was adopted” (citations omitted). That said, the facts in Rogers Communication are once again 
distinguishable from the circumstances surrounding the introduction of the “Heavy Oil” regulations. In 
Rogers Communication, the Court found that the only conclusion possible was that the purpose of the 
municipal measure was to prevent Rogers from installing its radiocommunication antenna system on a 
particular property (at para 44). Notwithstanding the BC Premier’s political rhetoric about stopping the 
Trans Mountain pipeline expansion, the environmental-protection purpose of the “Heavy Oil” regulations 
is credible, and finds support in the reasons for decision in Coastal First Nations, supra note 104 at para 53.   
136 AG Canada, “Heavy Oil Factum”, supra note 124 at paras 4-6, 8, 10, 13, 15, 17–34, 39–42, 107, 114–
31. 
137 Ibid at para 17 [emphasis added]. 
138 Ibid at para 123. 
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we have a world-class, in fact, elements of it are world-leading, pipeline safety 
system.”139 
 
All of which is marshaled by the federal government to support its key 
argument in the B.C. Heavy Oil reference: “[t]he NEB’s role as Canada’s national 
energy regulator would be seriously undermined if provinces could, under the guise 
of environmental legislation, stymie Canada’s national energy policy and impose a 
patchwork of regulations based on the political ideologies of particular provincial 
governments.”140 
 
So much for cooperative federalism. 
 
The federal government’s emphasis on the role played by the NEB is 
profoundly puzzling in light of the government’s own very public acknowledgement 
that the NEB had lost the trust of Canadians and was in need of reform (reform, I 
hasten to add, extending far beyond the enactment of the Pipeline Safety Act). After 
all, as late as 2014, the NEB refused to consider the climate change impacts of 
pipelines and the continued development of the oil sands.141 Following its election in 
2015, the new federal Liberal government conducted a systematic review of the NEB 
and called for its modernization.142 The expert panel convened by the Minister of 
Natural Resources reported, among other things, that “Canadians have serious 
concerns that the NEB has been ‘captured’ by the oil and gas industry, with many 
Board members who come from the industry that the NEB regulates, and who – at the 
very least appear to – have an innate bias toward that industry.”143 It is crucial here to 
acknowledge that in respect of what is supposed to be an arms-length regulatory body, 
this is a damning indictment. 
 
 
139 Ibid [emphasis added]. 
140 Ibid at 129 [emphasis added]. 
141 Forest Ethics Advocacy Association v National Energy Board, 2014 FCA 88; for further background and 
analysis of the NEB’s position on climate change, see Jason MacLean “Like Oil and Water? Canada’s 
Administrative and Legal Framework for Oil Sands Pipeline Development and Climate Change Mitigation” 
(2015) 2 Extractive Industries & Society 785. It should be noted that, as of this writing, neither the NEB nor 
the federal government appears to have conducted any analysis of how both its own and broader 
international efforts to avert the worst impacts of climate change will affect the long-term profitability of an 
expanded Trans Mountain pipeline: see Shawn McCarthy, “Lack of Climate Clarity Threatens Oil Reserve 
Values, Report Says”, The Globe and Mail (17 January 2019), online: <theglobeandmail.com>; Shawn 
McCarthy & Bill Curry, “Ottawa Sought Insider Industry Analysis for Trans Mountain Deal, Documents 
Reveal”, The Globe and Mail (21 January 2019), online: <theglobeandmail.com>. It has been disclosed, 
however, that the federal government may have overpaid for the expansion project by as much as $800 
million: see John Paul Tasker, “Ottawa May Have Overpaid for Trans Mountain by up to $1B, Parliamentary 
Budget Officer Says”, CBC News (31 January 2019), online: <cbc.ca/news> [Tasker, “Trans Mountain”].      
142 Expert Panel on the Modernization of the National Energy Board, Forward Together: Enabling Canada’s 
Clean, Safe, and Secure Energy Future: Report of the Expert Panel on the Modernization of the National 
Energy Board (15 May 2017), online (pdf): <nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/pdf/NEB-
Modernization-Report-EN-WebReady.pdf>.  
143 Ibid at 7. 
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Accordingly, the expert panel’s report recommended that, among other 
things, “the National Energy Board must align itself to the government’s 
environmental (particularly climate change), energy, social, and economic policy 
goals.”144 
 
This recommendation was made in respect of the very same and as yet 
unreformed NEB whose review of the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion project not 
only failed to assess the project’s cumulative greenhouse gas emissions and those 
emissions’ impact on Canada’s ability to meet its emissions-reduction pledges under 
the Paris Agreement, but also failed to assess the environmental effects of pipeline-
related marine shipping under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012.145  
 
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, in light of the NEB’s consistently poor and not-
infrequently controversial conduct,146 the federal government subsequently introduced 
Bill C-69, An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy 
Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential 
amendments to other acts.147 The Canadian Energy Regulator Act introduced by the 
bill would supersede the National Energy Board Act and replace the NEB with a new 
administrative agency, the Canadian Energy Regulator. 
 
This is all the federal government’s own very public doing. Yet the federal 
government refuses to acknowledge the patent inconsistency of criticizing, reviewing, 
and ultimately completely reshaping the NEB and its governing legislative framework, 
on the one hand, while redoubling its reliance on the NEB’s incomplete and inadequate 
review and recommendation of the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion project on the 
other. 
 
Indeed, and not a little ironically, the federal government has exposed itself 
to the allegation that it is using every political tool in its toolbox to proceed with the 
Trans Mountain expansion project by publicly and emphatically repeating that it will 
ensure that the pipeline will get built, particularly in response to the decision of the 
 
144 Ibid at 12 [emphasis added]. 
145 Tsleil-Waututh, supra note 81 at paras 765–66. As of this writing, the environmental nongovernmental 
organization Stand.earth (formerly Forest Ethics Advocacy Association), has—once again—filed a motion 
before the NEB requesting that the Board “meaningfully consider the general impact (up and downstream) 
the Trans Mountain Expansion Project, if approved, would have on greenhouse gas emissions and climate 
change” (short forms omitted). See Stand.earth, “Notice of Application of the Intervenor Stand.earth” (21 
January 2019), NEB File-OF-Fac-Oil-T260-2013-03 59, Hearing Order MH-052-2018. For additional 
background, see Tracy Sherlock, “IPCC Authors Urge NEB to Consider Climate Impacts of Trans Mountain 
Pipeline Expansion”, National Observer (21 January 2019), online: <nationalobserver.com>; Ian Bailey & 
Shawn McCarthy, “International Environmental Group Seeks Broader NEB Review of Trans Mountain 
Expansion”, The Globe and Mail (21 January 2019), online: <theglobeandmail.com>.  
146 For a further analysis of the NEB and abuses of administrative discretion, see Jason MacLean, 
“Autonomy in the Anthropocene? Libertarianism, Liberalism, and the Legal Theory of Environmental 
Regulation” (2017) 40:1 Dal LJ 279 at 320–21. 
147 Bill C-69, An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend 
the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 42-1 (presently in its 
Second Reading and referral to Committee before the Senate) [Bill C-69]. 
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Federal Court of Appeal in Tsleil-Waututh quashing Cabinet’s approval of the 
pipeline, not only because of the NEB’s deficient and unreasonable marine impacts 
assessment, but also because the federal government itself failed to satisfy its 
constitutional duty to consult and accommodate affected Indigenous groups.148 The 
Federal Court of Appeal held that the federal government failed to “engage, dialogue 
meaningfully and grapple with the concerns expressed to it in good faith by the 
Indigenous applicants so as to explore possible accommodations of these concerns.”149 
In particular, the Court found that the government declined to make a genuine and 
sustained effort “to pursue meaningful, two-way dialogue.”150 Nor did the government 
give serious consideration to whether any of the findings arising out of the NEB’s 
review of Trans Mountain were unreasonable or incorrect, or to amending or 
supplementing the NEB’s recommended conditions, which it had ample and 
uncontroversial legal authority to do.151 
 
As of this writing, the federal government’s renewed consultation of 
Indigenous peoples in respect of the Trans Mountain pipeline is ongoing, with no fixed 
date for its conclusion. No matter how ably this additional consultation is coordinated 
by former Supreme Court of Canada justice Frank Iacobucci, whom the federal 
government engaged to lead the process, the government’s repeated assertions that 
“the pipeline will be built” do little to quell the concern that the government’s “mind” 
throughout the consultations remains insufficiently “open” to satisfy the standard of 
meaningful consultation under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982: “[m]eaningful 
consultation ‘entails testing and being prepared to amend policy proposals in light of 
information received.’”152 In this sense, Trans Mountain’s past consultation – 
throughout which the government displayed a “closed-mindedness”153 – may well be 
prologue.                   
  
No matter how the renewed reconsideration of the Trans Mountain project 
concludes, additional judicial review is a virtual certainty. What really emerges from 
this dispute between the federal government and British Columbia over spilled oil, 
however, is the high hypocrisy of both parties’ equally high-minded appeals to 
cooperation, reconciliation, and meaningful climate action. The reaction of the B.C. 
NDP Member of Parliament Nathan Cullen to the Parliamentary Budget Office’s 
estimate that the federal government may have significantly overpaid for the Trans 
Mountain pipeline is apt. According to Mr. Cullen, the government needs to “stop this 
 
148 Tsleil-Waututh, supra note 81 at para 754. See e.g. David George-Cosh, “Morneau Vows Trans Mountain 
‘Will Be Built’ Despite Court Ruling”, BNN Bloomberg (30 August 2018), online: <bnnbloomberg.ca>.  
149 Tsleil-Waututh, supra note 81 at para 754. 
150 Ibid at para 756. 
151 Ibid at para 757. 
152 Ibid at para 501, citing Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 at para 46 
[emphasis added]. 
153 Ibid at para 603. 
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nightmare” and focus instead on investing in green technology and renewable 
resources.154 And yet the federal government shows no signs of doing so.155 
 
Nor can it be said, however, that British Columbia is pursuing a consistent 
and meaningful policy in respect of either climate change mitigation or reconciliation 
with Indigenous peoples. While the present B.C. NDP government opposes the Trans 
Mountain expansion project, not only because of its heavy oil spill risks, but also 
because – so it has claimed – the project is opposed by several Indigenous First Nations 
and communities and poses significant climate risks.156  
 
Regarding reconciliation, B.C. premier John Horgan made the following 
comparison of his government to the federal government after the latter announced its 
intention to purchase the Trans Mountain pipeline: “[b]oth governments have 
professed to embrace genuine reconciliation, and I’m not convinced you can 
necessarily do that when you’re disregarding the rights of Indigenous 
communities.”157 
 
Regarding climate change policy, Premier Horgan remarked in respect of the 
federal government’s purchase of Trans Mountain that “I have difficulty 
understanding, as [Washington State] Governor Inslee does, how investing in 
significant fossil fuel infrastructure, at a time when we’re trying to reduce our 
dependence on that infrastructure source, makes any sense. For me, and for British 
Columbians, we’re going to assert our jurisdiction.”158 
 
Yet the B.C. government has championed the construction of a natural gas 
liquefaction terminal in Kitimat, British Columbia, and a natural gas pipeline that will 
connect the terminal to hydraulic fracturing – or “fracking” – operations in and around 
Dawson Creek, British Columbia; the liquefaction terminal will convert the natural 
gas to liquefied natural gas (LNG), and the terminal project goes by the name LNG 
Canada; the natural gas pipeline, owned as of this writing by TransCanada Corp., is 
called the Coastal GasLink pipeline.159 
 
 
154 Nathan Cullen, quoted in Tasker, “Trans Mountain”, supra note 141.  
155 See e.g. MacLean, “Canada’s Gradual Climate Policy”, supra note 72. 
156 See e.g., Andrew Weichel, “B.C. Premier, Indigenous Groups Respond to Trans Mountain Purchase”, 
CTV News Vancouver (29 May 2018), online: <bc.ctvnews.ca>; Mychaylo Prystupa, “Federal Ministers 
Argue Trans Mountain Expansion is Necessary Part of Climate Plan”, The Tyee (21 March 2018), online: 
<thetyee.ca>. 
157 Weichel, supra note 156 [emphasis added]. 
158 Prystupa, supra note 156 [emphasis added]. 
159 For project background and details, see LNG Canada, online: <lngcanada.ca/>. See also Brent Jang, 
“LNG Canada CEO Vows to Press Ahead with Gas Project Facing Protests”, The Globe and Mail (22 
January 2019), online: <theglobeandmail.com> [Jang, “LNG Canada CEO”].  
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The Coastal GasLink pipeline component of LNG Canada faces significant 
opposition from the hereditary leaders of the Wet’suwet’en First Nation;160 while the 
pipeline has support from elected First Nations Band councilors, the territory is 
unceded, and pursuant to the Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark decision in 
Delgamuukw v British Columbia, the legal title holders are the hereditary leaders, not 
Band-level leaders, whose jurisdiction pursuant to the Indian Act is limited to 
reserves.161 
 
Andy Calitz, the CEO of LNG Canada, which is part of a larger consortium 
headed by Royal Dutch Shell, expressed little interest in the distinction between 
hereditary governance and Band-level governance: “I’m not convinced that it’s 
possible for major infrastructure projects in British Columbia to get unanimous 
support. Our project is a case in point. The conversation about hereditary versus 
elected systems of governance, and which hereditary leaders speak for Indigenous 
people, is a conversation I will leave to other people to resolve.”162  
 
Premier Horgan’s initial reaction to this governance dispute, however, 
seemed merely to restate the problem, if not beg the question entirely: “[i]t is my view 
that LNG Canada has shown they understand the importance of consultation and 
meaningful reconciliation with First Nations, and that is why they have signed 
agreements with every First Nation along the corridor.”163 
 
How to reconcile the B.C. NDP government’s incongruent position on 
reconciliation with First Nations? It is hard to improve upon the interpretation offered 
by an evidently exasperated reader of The Globe and Mail, who wrote the following 
letter to the paper’s editor: 
 
For those confused about B.C. Premier John Horgan’s stance on Indigenous 
consent regarding pipelines, I believe it to be as follows: LNG Canada 
directly affects his NDP government’s finances and therefore does not 
require unanimous consent. Trans Mountain does not directly affect Mr. 
Horgan’s government’s finances, just Canada’s, and therefore requires 
unanimous Indigenous consent.164 
 
LNG Canada’s climate impacts are equally difficult to square with British Columbia’s 
commitments to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, including methane emissions, 
 
160 Ibid. 
161 Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010, 153 DLR (4th) 193. 
162 Jang, “LNG Canada CEO”, supra note 159.  
163 Richard Zussman, “B.C. Premier John Horgan Expecting ‘Peaceful Resolution’ to Natural Gas Pipeline 
Protest”, Global News (9 January 2019), online: <globalnews.ca>.  
164 Dan Petryk, “Another Oh-so-Canadian Pipeline mess. Plus Other Letters to the Editor”, The Globe and 
Mail (10 January 2019), online: <theglobeandmail.com>. Nor is this an isolated case. The BC government’s 
decision to approve the construction of Site C mega-dam to produce hydroelectricity has drawn significant 
criticism from Indigenous communities and environmental advocates: See e.g. David Schindler & Faisal 
Moola, “Opinion: Decision to Approve Site C Undermines Reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples and 
Long-term Action on Climate Change”, Vancouver Sun (20 December 2017), online: <vancouversun.com>.   
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and its reliance on long-term fossil fuels infrastructure. It is estimated that LNG 
Canada’s completion would render British Columbia’s greenhouse gas emissions 
targets under its current climate change plan impossible to meet.165 Moreover, like 
other jurisdictions, British Columbia has yet to resolve the natural gas sector’s ongoing 
inability to prevent methane leaks and ensure that hydraulic fracturing does not 
contaminate local water supplies and contribute to public health problems.166 
 
The jurisdictional knots that the federal government and the provincial 
governments of British Columbia and Saskatchewan (and others) continue to tie 
themselves into have little – if anything – to do with genuine disagreements about the 
division of powers under the Constitution. Nor can any of these governments 
legitimately ground their positions on pipelines – or carbon prices – in a genuine 
concern to act urgently and ambitiously on climate change, environmental protection, 
or reconciliation with Indigenous peoples. These governments’ positions instead 
reflect an unabated commitment to a fiscal and economic development policy rooted, 
not in the promotion of renewable energy, green technology, and a just transition 
toward sustainability, but rather in the extraction and exportation of non-renewable 
fossil fuels. This unsustainable policy commitment – neatly illustrated by Figure Two 
below – comes into even clearer view in the context of the controversy surrounding 
the reform of Canada’s environmental assessment processes embodied by Bill C-69, 
dubbed by its critics as the “no pipelines bill,”167 which is discussed in the next section.  
 
165 See e.g. Brent Jang, “B.C.’s Climate Targets Will Be Impossible to Reach if LNG Canada Project Goes 
ahead, Critics Say”, The Globe and Mail (21 September 2018), online: <theglobeandmail.com>; Justine 
Hunter, “Now It’s the BC NDP’s Turn to Square the Circle on LNG and Greenhouse-gas Emissions”, The 
Globe and Mail (16 September 2018), online: <theglobeandmail.com>.   
166 Karen Tam Wu, “LNG Canada’s Announcement Presents Big Challenge to B.C.’s Clean Growth” (2 
October 2018), Pembina Institute (blog), online: <pembina.org/media-release/lng-canada-fid>.  
167 See Shawn McCarthy, “Senators Challenge Efficacy of Liberals’ Resource Project Assessment Plan”, 
The Globe and Mail (6 February 2019), online: <theglobeandmail.com>.  
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III.  Kill Bill C-69 (the “no pipelines bill”) 
 
Bill C-69168 is the surprisingly controversial (in some quarters) legislative response of 
the federal Liberal government to the widespread public perception that the regulatory 
framework for assessing the environmental impacts of economic projects in Canada is 
broken (see Figure Three below). I say “surprisingly” because, at first glance, the bill 
would seem to offer industrial project proponents everything they could wish for in 
terms of environmental assessment legislation. As the Deputy Minister of 
Environment and Climate Change Canada describes it, Bill C-69’s proposed Impact 
Assessment Act “provides a predictable, time-bound process, from early planning 
through to the decision, to ensure that companies know what to expect and when.”169 
 
 
168 Bill C-69, supra note 147. 
169 Stephen Lucas, Deputy Minister of Environment and Climate Change, quoted in McCarthy, supra note 
167. 
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Given these defining features, including assessment timeframes tighter than 
those provided by the current legislation, the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Act, 2012,170 environmental advocates were initially critical of the legislation, whereas 
one major industry sector subject to the new bill strongly supported it. These initial 
reactions are telling. The environmental nongovernmental organization, MiningWatch 
Canada, reacted to Bill C-69 – especially the bill’s proposed Impact Assessment Act – 
in the following, highly skeptical terms: “the worst outcome for both sustainability 
and democracy would be a process that gives the government adequate credibility with 
enough specific sectors of the public to allow it to make and enforce decisions that 
 
170 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, SC 2012, c 19, s 52. For a discussion of the legislative 
changes to the environmental assessment regime introduced by this Act in 2012, see Meinhard Doelle, 
“CEAA 2012: The End of Federal EA as We Know It?” (2012) 24 J Envtl L & Prac 1. 
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may have nothing to do with sustainability and evidence, or climate commitments, or 
environmental protection, or Indigenous peoples’ rights and livelihoods.”171 
 
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, in light of MiningWatch Canada’s reaction to Bill 
C-69, the Mining Association of Canada, which represents and speaks on behalf of 
Canada’s largest mining companies, cautiously supported the bill. According to the 
Association, the bill’s Impact Assessment Act will increase the likelihood of timelier 
decisions, reduce uncertainty, and enable federal, provincial, and Indigenous 
government collaboration to deliver on the perennial industry desire for “one project, 
one assessment.”172 Overall, the Association’s view is that “if well implemented, Bill 
C-69 holds the promise of improving upon predecessor legislation [CEAA, 2012] for 
most mines and the status quo”.173 
 
The Mining Association’s reasoning is hardly radical. Yet the Association’s 
CEO, Pierre Gratton, reports having received “hate mail” from opponents of the bill.174 
A number of industry organizations have mobilized to lobby the Senate against the 
bill, including the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, the Chemistry 
Industry Association of Canada, the Association of Canadian Port Authorities, and the 
Canadian Energy Pipeline Association, which claims that if Bill C-69 is enacted, 
Canada will “never see another pipeline built.”175 
 
Perhaps the most pointed opposition to the bill is expressed by an astroturf 
organization that calls itself “Suits and Boots.”176 Of Suits and Boots’ “10 Reasons to 
Kill Bill C-69 in Canada’s Senate,”177 three in particular provoked a response from 
environmental advocates and scholars, who, despite their earlier criticisms of the bill’s 
failures to meaningfully promote climate change mitigation, sustainability, or 
reconciliation with Indigenous peoples, among other pressing objectives,178 have, in a 
volte-face, attempted to defend the bill against its industry critics. 
 
171 Jamie Kneen, “Bill C-69: New Federal Environmental Review Laws Fall Short of Promises” (9 February 
2018), MiningWatch Canada (blog), online: <miningwatch.ca>. A substantially similar conclusion was 
reached by a consortium of environmental nongovernmental organizations, not only in respect of the federal 
government’s proposed new Impact Assessment Act, but also in respect of its overall performance in 
attempting to enhance environmental protection and related Indigenous rights and interests. See Ėquiterre 
et al, “Clock is Ticking: A Mid-Term Report Card on the Federal Government and its Work on the 
Environment” (May 2018), online (pdf): <equiterre.org/sites/fichiers/gvt_midterm_report_eng.pdf >.    
172 Pierre Gratton, “Bill C-69: A Step Forward for Canada’s Mining Sector”, The Globe and Mail (16 
September 2018), online: <theglobeandmail.com>. (Mr. Gratton is the CEO of the Mining Association of 
Canada.)  
173 Ibid. 
174 Gabriel Friedman & Geoffrey Morgan, “Bill C-69 Fuels Battle”, Financial Post (16 February 2019) C1. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Online, <suitsandboots.ca>. For an initial reaction to Suits and Boots’ claims about Bill C-69, see Martin 
Olszynski, “Bill C-69’s Detractors Can Blame Harper’s 2012 Omnibus Overreach”, Calgary Herald (26 
September 2018), online: <calgaryherald.com>.      
177 Ibid. 
178 Meinhard Doelle, “Bill C-69: The Proposed New Federal Impact Assessment Act (IAA)” (9 February 
2018), Environmental Law News (blog), online: <blogs.dal.ca/melaw/2018/02/09/bill-c-69-the-proposed-
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Suits and Boots argues, for example, that Bill C-69 will furnish the Minister 
of the Environment and Climate Change with too much discretionary power to reject 
projects. Some of the bill’s environmentalist defenders counter that the current regime 
under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 is even more discretionary, 
and that under the bill’s new Impact Assessment Act the government will have to give 
detailed reasons for its project decisions.179 In reality, however, because the Federal 
Court of Appeal has established such an excessively low bar for the standard of 
reasonableness of environmental assessment decision-making on judicial review,180 
the government need only document that it gave “some consideration”181 to the Impact 
Assessment Act’s public interest factors (about which more below). So long as the 
government formally ticks those statutory boxes, the courts will continue to defer to 
the government’s discretionary policy decisions.182 
 
Suits and Boots further argues that Bill C-69 is biased because it was 
introduced by the Minister of the Environment and Climate Change, while the bill’s 
defenders counter that the Minister of Natural Resources was significantly involved 
throughout the bill’s gestation (which is true), and that the bill reflects the results of 
two years of extensive public engagement and hearings (which is untrue).183 Once 
again, the reality is more nuanced. After the expert panel on environmental assessment 
reform appointed by the federal government released its comprehensive final report 
based on its broad engagement with a diverse array of stakeholders across Canada,184 
the federal government immediately distanced itself from the expert panel’s report in 
 
new-federal-impact-assessment-act/>; Chris Tollefson, “Environmental assessment Bill as a lost 
opportunity”, Policy Options (14 February 2018), online: <policyoptions.irpp.org>; Jason MacLean, “Kill 
Bill C-69 – it Undermines Efforts to Tackle Climate Change”, The Conversation (25 October 2018), online: 
<theconversation.com>.    
179 See e.g. the defence of Bill C-69 offered by Mark Winfield, Deborah Curran & Martin Olszynski, “How 
Post-truth Politics is Sinking Debate on Environmental Assessment Reform”, The Conversation (11 October 
2018), online: <theconversation.com>. 
180 Ontario Power Generation Inc v Greenpeace Canada et al, 2015 FCA 186 at para 130 [Ontario Power 
Generation]. For a commentary on the decision, see Martin Olszynski & Meinhard Doelle, “Ontario Power 
Generation Inc. v Greenpeace Canada: Form over Substance Leads to a ‘Low Threshold’ for Federal 
Environmental Assessment” (23 September 2015), ABlawg.ca (blog), online (pdf): <ablawg.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/Blog_MOandMD_Ontario-Power-Generation-Inc-_FCA_20Sept2015.pdf>. 
181 Ontario Power Generation, supra note 180 at para 130. 
182 For an analysis of Canadian courts’ tendency to excessively defer to governmental decisions in respect 
of environmental matters, see Jason MacLean & Chris Tollefson, “Climate-Proofing Judicial Review Post-
Paris: Judicial Competence, Capacity, and Courage” (2018) 31:3 J Envtl L & Prac 245; Lynda Collins & 
Lorne Sossin, “In Search of an Ecological Approach to Constitutional Principles and Environmental 
Discretion in Canada” (2019) 52:1 UBC L Rev 293. 
183 Winfield, Curran & Olszynski, supra note 179. 
184 Expert Panel for the Review of Environmental Assessment Processes, Building Common Ground: A New 
Vision for Impact Assessment in Canada (Ottawa: CEEA, 2017) online (pdf): 
<canada.ca/content/dam/themes/environment/conservation/environmental-reviews/building-common-
ground/building-common-ground.pdf>. 
164 UNBLJ    RD UN-B [VOL/TOME 70 
response to industry criticism.185 The expert panel’s recommendations are barely 
recognizable in Bill C-69. The bill follows two years of consultations, but it is neither 
based on nor reflective of those consultations.186 
 
Finally, Suits and Boots argues that Bill C-69 will transform Canada’s 
voluntary climate commitments into enforceable legal obligations that our trading 
partners could use against us. Relatedly, Conservative Senator Michael MacDonald 
describes industry representatives’ – and some of his fellow Senators’ – concerns “that 
the complexity and detail and long prescriptive lists of factors to be considered in 
evaluating projects in this voluminous bill will enhance the risk of litigation that could 
drag on forever. This complexity and detail in the bill could not only kill viable 
projects, but will drive investment away from Canada.”187 
 
The mandatory factors to be considered in the Bill’s Impact Assessment Act 
are set out in sections 22 and 63 of that Act, which respectively provide – as of this 
writing – as follows: 
 
Factors – impact assessment 
 
22 (1) The impact assessment of a designated project, whether it is 
conducted by the Agency or a review panel, must take into account the 
following factors: 
 
(a) the changes to the environment or to health, social or economic 
conditions and the positive and negative consequences of these changes that 
are likely to be caused by the carrying out of the designated project, 
including 
 
 (i) the effects of malfunctions or accidents that may occur in 
 connection with the designated project, 
 
(ii) any cumulative effects that are likely to result from the 
 designated project in combination with other physical 
 activities that have been or will be carried out, and 
 
 (iii) the result of any interaction between those effects; 
 
(b) mitigation measures that are technically and economically feasible and 
that would mitigate any adverse effects of the designated project; 
 
(c) the impact that the designated project may have on any Indigenous group 
and any adverse impact that the designated project may have on the rights 
 
185 Martin Olszynski et al, “Sustainability in Canada’s Environmental Assessment”, Policy Options (5 
September 2017), online: <policyoptions.irpp.org>. 
186 For an analysis of the oil and gas industry’s capture of the regulatory review process leading up to the 
tabling of Bill C-69, see Jason MacLean, “Regulatory Capture and the Role of Academics in Public 
Policymaking: Lessons from Canada’s Environmental Regulatory Review Process” 52:2 UBC L Rev 
(forthcoming in 2019).  
187 Conservative Senator Michael MacDonald, quoted in McCarthy, supra note 167. 
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of the Indigenous peoples of Canada recognized and affirmed by section 35 
of the Constitution Act, 1982; 
 
(d) the purpose and need for the designated project; 
 
(e) alternative means of carrying out the designated project that are 
technically and economically feasible, including through the use of best 
available technologies, and the effects of those means; 
 
(f) any alternatives to the designated project that are technically and 
economically feasible and are directly related to the designated project; 
 
(g) Indigenous knowledge provided with respect to the designated project; 
 
(h) the extent to which the designated project contributes to sustainability; 
 
(i) the extent to which the effects of the designated project hinder or 
contribute to the Government of Canada’s ability to meet its environmental 
obligations and its commitments in respect of climate change; 
 
(j) any change to the designated project that may be caused by the 
environment; 
 
(k) the requirements of the follow-up program in respect of the designated 
project; 
 
(l) considerations related to Indigenous cultures raised with respect to the 
designated project; 
 
(m) community knowledge provided with respect to the designated project; 
 
(n) comments received from the public; 
 
(o) comments from a jurisdiction that are received in the course of 
consultations conducted under section 21; 
 
(p) any relevant assessment referred to in section 92, 93 or 95; 
 
(q) any assessment of the effects of the designated project that is conducted 
by or on behalf of an Indigenous governing body and that is provided with 
respect to the designated project; 
 
(r) any study or plan that is conducted or prepared by a jurisdiction – or an 
Indigenous governing body not referred to in paragraph (f) or (g) of the 
definition of jurisdiction in section 2 – that is in respect of a region related 
to the designated project and that has been provided with respect to the 
project; 
 
(s) the intersection of sex and gender with other identity factors; and  
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(t) any other matter relevant to the impact assessment that the Agency or – 
if the impact assessment is referred to a review panel – the Minister requires 
to be taken into account.188 
 
Before proceeding to the Act’s mandatory “public interest” factors, notice that, in 
respect of the factors to be considered under section 22, the Agency or review panel, 
neither of which is the decision-maker under the Act, must merely take the foregoing 
factors into account in conducting its assessment; it need not base its assessment on 
any one of these factors, let alone on all of them taken together. 
 
In the same vein, the federal Cabinet’s ultimate decision in respect of a project 
designated for assessment must be based on (1) the Impact Assessment Agency’s 
report taking into account the section 22 factors, and (2) the Minister’s consideration 
of the following public interest factors under section 63 of the Impact Assessment Act: 
 
Factors – public interest 
 
63 The Minister’s determination under paragraph 60(1)(a) in respect of a 
designated project referred to in that subsection, the Governor in Council’s 
determination under section 62 in respect of a designated project referred to 
in that subsection, must be based on the report with respect to the impact 
assessment and a consideration of the following factors: 
 
 (a) the extent to which the designated project contributes to  sustainability; 
 
 (b) the extent to which the adverse effects within federal jurisdiction and the 
adverse direct or incidental effects that are indicated in the impact 
assessment report in respect of the designated project are adverse; 
 
 (c) the implementation of the mitigation measures that the Minister or the 
Governor in Council, as the case may be, considers appropriate; 
 
 (d) the impact that the designated project many have on any 
 Indigenous group and any adverse impact that the designated 
 project may have on the rights of the Indigenous peoples of 
 Canada recognized and affirmed by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982; 
and 
 
 (e) the extent to which the effects of the designated project  hinder or 
contribute to the Government of Canada’s ability to meet its environmental 
obligations and its commitments in respect of climate change.189 
 
Regarding these “public interest” factors guiding project approval decisions under the 
Act, three observations are pertinent. First, like the factors enumerated under section 
22 of the Act, the public interest factors under section 63 guiding Cabinet 
determinations of the public interest must be based, not directly on the enumerated 
factors themselves, but on a consideration of those factors. The distinction is subtle, 
 
188 Bill C-69, Impact Assessment Act, supra note 151, s 22. 
189 Ibid at s 63. 
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but significant. Given that the Cabinet is the decision-maker, its consideration of the 
factors will be paid considerable deference by reviewing courts,190 particularly insofar 
as those factors disclose highly factual and polycentric policy issues, and 
environmental assessments characteristically do.191 
 
Second, notice that the factors (a), (b), (d), and (e) enumerated under section 
63 are also included in section 22. This effectively invites Cabinet to give its own 
consideration to each of these factors already considered by the assessment agency or 
panel, whose consideration will be reflected in its report, which Cabinet will also 
consider; this interpretation is supported by paragraph 63(c), which explicitly provides 
that the Minister or Cabinet may substitute its own view of the implementation of 
appropriate mitigation measures. While this certainly broadens the discretion of 
Cabinet, contrary to industry concerns raised in respect of this Act, that discretion has 
overwhelmingly favoured project proponents throughout the history of Canadian 
environmental assessment legislation.192 Moreover, there is little to no evidence 
capable of supporting industry’s presumptive concern that the winds of the 
government’s discretion are about to change direction anytime soon.  
 
Third, contrary to the claims of Suits and Boots, nothing in sections 22 and 
63 of the Act make Canada’s climate commitments legally binding. As Bill C-69’s 
defenders observe, the requirement to consider Canada’s climate commitments is 
“wobbly” at best.193 As the Minister of the Environment and Climate Change herself 
asserted, ostensibly to allay the concerns of Canada’s oil and gas industry, she would 
have approved the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion project under the new Impact 
Assessment Act set out in Bill C-69. According to Minister McKenna: “[y]ou can 
expect that it would have been approved. It’s going to create good jobs. We need this 
project to go ahead.”194 
 
So much for Bill C-69 as the “no pipelines bill.”  
 
 
190 The leading case for this proposition is Agraira v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36. In Agraira, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the relevant Minister had 
considerable latitude in interpreting a statutory provision mandating decisions be made in the “national 
interest”. See ibid at para 50.  
191 See e.g. Gitxaala Nation v Canada, 2016 FCA 187 [Gitxaala Nation], leave to appeal refused, [2016] 
SCCA No 386. Writing for a unanimous Federal Court of Appeal, Stratas JA observed that “[i]n conducting 
its assessment [of the Northern Gateway oil pipeline project proposal], the Governor in Council has to 
balance a broad variety of matters, most of which are more properly within the realm of the executive, such 
as economic, social, cultural, environmental and political matters”: at para 140 [emphasis added]. 
According to Stratas JA, “[t]he standard of review for decisions such as this—discretionary decisions 
founded upon the widest considerations of policy and public interest—is reasonableness”: ibid at para 145.   
192 See Olszynski et al, supra note 185. 
193 Martin Olszynski, “Bill C-69’s Detractors Can Blame Harper’s 2012 Omnibus Overreach (Blog Edition)” 
(25 September 2018), ABlawg.ca (blog), online (pdf): <ablawg.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/Blog_MO_Bill_C_69_Sept2018.pdf>. 
194 Minister Catherine McKenna, quoted in Zi-Ann Lum, “Kinder Morgan Pipeline Would Still Get Green 
Light Under New Rules”, Huffington Post (8 February 2018), online: <huffingtonpost.ca>.  
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As the bill’s academic defenders argue, its legislation “represents incremental 
– not radical – changes to the regime that now exists.”195 
 
The trouble with this tepid defence is that it is entirely true. As the UN IPCC’s 
special report on 1.5 ºC global warming released in 2018 makes clear, the time for 
incremental changes has passed. The IPCC’s report calls for rapid, systemic, and 
unprecedented changes in how governments, industries, and societies function in order 
to limit global warming to 1.5 ºC above the pre-industrial norm and thereby avoid the 
most catastrophic consequences of climate change.196 While the industry and political 
critics of Bill C-69 appear to effectively deny that Canada has any responsibility to 
take aggressive and ambitious action on climate change,197 let alone reconciliation 
with Indigenous peoples, the bill’s NGO and academic defenders appear not to 
understand the urgency of radically reorienting our regulatory processes toward 
greater sustainability and reconciliation. Rather, they remain rooted in the taken-for-
granted staples ideology198 of Canada’s Prime Minister, who remarked to an approving 
audience of oil and gas industry participants in Houston, Texas that “[n]o country 
would find 173 billion barrels of oil in the ground and just leave them.”199 In the 
concluding section of the article, I discuss the implications of this ideology for the 
future of Canada’s climate and sustainability policies.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As the year 2018 drew to a close, the discount at which the sour (sulphuric) and heavy 
Alberta oil sands bitumen crude – Western Canadian Select – typically trades relative 
to the sweeter and lighter North American benchmark – West Texas Intermediate – 
ballooned to an historic high, nearly CDN$50.200 The discrepancy between the two 
market rates was likely due to a number of factors, including maintenance issues at 
some US oil refineries and the anticipation of the coming-into-force in 2020 of the 
International Maritime Organization’s rule limiting the sulphur content of bunker 
fuels.201 Canadian observers, however, emphasized the lack of oil transport capacity 
(rail and pipeline) relative to increasing levels of oil sands production.202 
 
 
195 Winfield, Curran & Olszynski, supra note 179. 
196 IPCC, supra note 4. 
197 See e.g. Gary Mason arguing that “Conservative political leaders in this country simply do not believe 
climate change is their problem to solve” in “Carbon-tax Opponents Don’t Let Facts Get in the Way”, The 
Globe and Mail (15 February 2019), online: <theglobeandmail.com>. 
198 See e.g. Jason MacLean characterizing Canada as a “carbon democracy” in “Paris and Pipelines? 
Canada’s Climate Policy Puzzle” (2018) 32:1 J Envtl L & Prac 47 at 49–57. 
199 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, quoted in Berke, supra note 3. 
200 Kyle Bakx, “3 Reasons Why Alberta Oil Prices Have Sunk”, CBC News (4 October 2018), online: 
<cbc.ca/news>.  
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid. 
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The mainstream media and prominent public figures characterized the 
abnormally high Canadian crude discount as a full-blown national economic crisis,203 
notwithstanding financial analyses such as the Royal Bank of Canada’s assessment 
indicating that the “near-term impact to the Canadian economy is less than some may 
believe” (i.e. no more than 0.4% of Canadian gross domestic product, and likely 
less).204 Rather than calling for the oil-dependent economies of Alberta and 
Saskatchewan to diversify while at the bottom of the boom-bust cycle typical of 
volatile natural resource commodities, consistent with the policy analysis of the 
International Energy Agency,205 the typical Canadian response was to redouble calls 
for new oil pipeline construction. For example, Canada’s leading (and generally sober) 
newspaper, The Globe and Mail, characterized the problem and its solution thus: 
“Canada is living in an energy nightmare. The only solution is for Ottawa to focus on 
getting the Trans Mountain expansion approved in the shortest time possible”,206 
climate change consequences be hanged. Remarkably, just as the carbon pricing and 
Heavy Oil references are framed as being about the constitution, and just as Bill C-69 
is framed as being about certainty, efficiency, and approving new pipelines, the crude 
crisis’s climate policy implications were entirely ignored.   
 
Early in 2019, the crude crisis having largely dissipated and returned to its 
normal level absent the addition of rail or pipeline capacity (although attributable in 
part to modest production cuts temporarily mandated by the Alberta government), 
direct calls for pipeline construction, along with indirect calls expressed as opposition 
to Bill C-69, the “no pipelines bill,” continued unabated. Jason Kenney, the leader of 
the United Conservative Party of Alberta, promised that if elected in the province’s 
spring 2019 election, he would adopt a much more combative approach against 
Ottawa, other provinces, and environmental advocates over the fate of new oil 
pipelines.207 Kenney’s argument was that the Trans Mountain expansion has been 
stalled in part because the governing provincial NDP party has not been aggressive 
enough.208 Kenney argued that the federal government ought to constitutionally 
declare the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion to be in “the general advantage of 
Canada.”209Alberta’s United Conservative Party’s 2018 “Policy Declaration” similarly 
asserts that the Alberta government should “facilitate private sector pipeline, energy 
corridor and infrastructure developments that maximize value and opportunities in the 
 
203 Dan Healing, “‘This is Very Much a Crisis’: Prime Minister Justin Trudeau Says of Low Alberta Oil 
Price”, Global News (22 November 2018), online: <globalnews.ca>.  
204 Royal Bank of Canada, “Lost in Transportation: Putting the Discount on Canadian Heavy Oil in Context” 
(9 May 2018), online (pdf): <rbc.com/economics/economic-reports/pdf/other-
reports/WCS%20spread_May2018.pdf>. 
205 IEA, supra note 9. 
206 “Globe Editorial: Alberta’s Disastrous Oil Price Discount? Blame Canada”, The Globe and Mail (23 
November 2018), online: <theglobeandmail.com>.  
207 James Keller, “UCP’s Kenney Vows to Take Tougher Stand on Pipelines than Notley’s NDP”, The Globe 
and Mail (17 February 2019), online: <theglobeandmail.com>.  
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
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extraction, utilization and export of Alberta’s energy products.”210 The United 
Conservative Party’s policy platform is silent, tellingly, on the issue of climate 
change.211  
 
The continued support and subsidization of expanding oil and gas production 
extends beyond Canada. Demand for oil and gas continues to rise globally, and the 
industry is planning multi-trillion-dollar investments to meet it, far surpassing the 
global annual investment of approximately US$300 billion.212 As The Economist 
magazine observes, echoing the IPCC’s special report on 1.5 ºC global warming, the 
next decade will be critical for mitigating climate change. Further observing the 
failures of technological innovation, activist financial investors, enlightened corporate 
self-interest, and litigation commenced against major investor-owned oil companies 
to curb the production and consumption of fossil fuels, The Economist resigned itself 
to the conclusion that “the burden must fall on the political system.”213 
 
The political system in Canada does not provide grounds for optimism. As 
discussed in this article, the most prominent public policy issues relevant to fossil fuels 
and climate change – narrowly-drawn legal disputes over carbon pricing, pipeline 
approvals, and project assessment more generally – serve only to distract from and 
delay the far more complex policy questions about how to reconcile demands for 
robust economic growth and ambitious climate change mitigation.214 A stunningly 
candid – if calculated – admission of the federal government’s failure to date to 
meaningfully address climate change was recently expressed as a “non sequitur” in the 
widely-reported resignation in early 2019 of Gerald Butts, the Principal Secretary and 
primary political advisor of the Prime Minister. According to Mr. Butts:  
 
I also need to say this (and I know it’s a non sequitur). Our kids and 
grandkids will judge us on one issue above all others. That issue is climate 
change. I hope the response to it becomes the collective, non-partisan, 
urgent effort that science clearly says is required. I hope that happens 
soon.215 
 
 
210 United Conservative Party, “Policy Declaration 2018” at 8, online (pdf): 
<unitedconservative.ca/Content/UCP%20Policy%20Declaration.pdf>.  
211 Following his election as provincial premier in the spring of 2019, Kenney began publicly contemplating 
a constitutional challenge to Bill C-69. For further background, see John Paul Tasker, “Kenney Warns of 
Constitutional Challenge if Environmental Assessment Overhaul is Passed as Written”, CBC News (2 May 
2019), online: <cbc.ca/news>. 
212 “Crude Awakening: ExxonMobil and the Oil Industry are Making a Bet that Could End up Wrecking the 
Climate”, The Economist (9–15 February 2019) at 9. 
213 Ibid. 
214 See e.g. Nathalie Chalifour & Jason MacLean, “Courts Should Not Have to Decide Climate Policy”, 
Policy Options (21 December 2018), online: <policyoptions.irpp.org>; Jason MacLean, “The Carbon Tax 
Case is a Dangerous Political Game”, The Globe and Mail (13 February 2019), online: 
<theglobeandmail.com>; MacLean, Chalifour & Mascher, supra note 11.  
215 The Canadian Press, “Full Text of Gerald Butts’s Resignation Letter”, The Globe and Mail (18 February 
2019), online: <theglobeandmail.com> [emphasis added]. 
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Such is the “peril of pipelines and the riddle of resources,” the theme of this timely 
special issue: Despite the clear scientific and moral basis for urgent and ambitious 
action on climate change, we continue to delay meaningful action while we support 
and subsidize fossil fuels production.216 
 
How to break this paradoxical and perverse cycle? This is the question that 
climate science, law, and policy research must answer, and soon.217 Doing so will 
require interdisciplinary collaboration both among academics and practitioners at all 
levels of policy intervention. Indeed, this urgent question calls for an entirely new field 
of its own.218     
 
216 As of this writing, it has been ten years since the federal government promised to eliminate subsidies to 
fossil fuels production and export in Canada, which is estimated to exceed $3 billion annually. So extensive 
is the extent of the Canadian government’s subsidization of oil and gas activities, and so reluctant is the 
government to fully disclose the full extent of its subsidization of the industry while it defends its approach 
to mitigating climate change, over 20 months after the Auditor General of Canada observed that the 
government could not identify and itemize its non-tax-based support for the industry, the government has 
still yet to do so: see Carl Meyer, “‘It’s Like Pulling Teeth’: Catherine McKenna Accused of Stalling on 
Fossil Fuel Subsidies”, National Observer (14 February 2019), online: <nationalobserver.com>.    
217 Answering this question is beyond the scope of this or any one article. Indeed, it deserves a special issue 
all its own. The central importance and urgency of this question is illustrated, for example, by the theme of 
the upcoming tenth International Sustainability Transitions Conference, whose theme is the challenge of 
accelerating such transitions, especially in light of (1) the challenges faced by countries like Canada, 
Australia, and many developing states with substantial—and politically influential—export-oriented 
resource-extraction sectors, and (2) the need to integrate the experience and self-governance of Indigenous 
peoples into sustainability transitions research and policy. For more information on this especially pertinent 
conference, see the call for submissions, online: <carleton.ca/istconference/call-for-papers/>. See also Jason 
MacLean, Meinhard Doelle & Chis Tollefson, “The Science, Law, and Politics of Canada’s Pathways to 
Paris: Introduction to the UBC Law Review’s Special Section on Canada and Climate Change” (2019) 52:1 
UBC L Rev 225.  
218 Thomas Sterner et al, “Policy Design for the Anthropocene” (2019) 2:1 Nature Sustainability 14 at 20.  
